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ABSTRACT
OUT OF FOCUS: COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS OF PARTIAL SUBSTITUTABILITY
Andrew P. Boysen
Daniel A. Levinthal
An extensive literature on competition between substitute technologies assumes that any
buyer will only adopt a single technology. I propose that this assumption biases predicted
outcomes, with implications for strategic decisions on technology trajectories, competition,
the adoption and diffusion of new technologies, and long-term industry evolution. Buyers
may choose the single option that best meets their range of needs but, given a range of
needs, many will buy multiple technologies, to use each where most appropriate. You
might predict that laptops will disrupt desktops, or that tablets will disrupt laptops. As
partial substitutes, however, many buyers will adopt more than one of these technologies.
In this paper I develop a formal model to better explore substitute competition, arguing
that optimal technology trajectories in a “single purchase world” may be sub-optimal in a
“multiple purchase world.” I further develop the model to show how adoption history affects
technology adoption and diffusion, which can create roadblocks or bridges not explained by
existing models. Based on the model, I develop hypotheses arguing that the introduction
of a new substitute not only directly affects existing competitors through substitutability,
but also indirectly affects the relative opportunities between competitors through indirect
complementarity, where the introduction of a technology may induce switching between
related substitutes. I test my predictions in the digital camera industry, using a novel
dataset that allows me to use metadata from photos uploaded to a popular photo sharing
site to track individual adoption and use over time. In line with predictions, user adoption
of smartphones is associated with changes in adoption behavior for interchangeable lens
cameras, as more distant substitutes, and the co-use of multiple partial substitutes.
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION
The threat of substitutes is critical in the strategy literature (e.g., Porter, 1979, 1985), and
these dynamics are often explored in the rich body of research on the displacement of one
technology by another, considering demand-side factors. However, a complete understanding of substitute competition has been limited by a common simplifying assumption, that
competing substitutes are mutually exclusive. The classic question asks why existing technologies fail in the face of innovative substitute technologies (Henderson and Clark, 1990;
Christensen and Bower, 1996; Adner, 2002) or, symmetrically, what is necessary for an incumbent to succeed (Henderson, 1995; Tripsas, 1997). This stream of literature typically
assumes the emergence or sustainability of a single dominant technology or, perhaps, market segmentation through competitive isolation or retreat to a defensible niche (e.g., Adner,
2002; Adner and Snow, 2010). Where the success of multiple survivors is considered, it tends
to be in the context of winning eco-systems of complementors working together (Kapoor,
2013).
This research has yielded considerable insight into “zero-sum” competition between close
substitutes, where only a single technology may be viable, as frequently illustrated in
the winner-take-all examinations of the empirical contexts used in this stream of literature. While competition with close substitutes is absolutely critical for competitive success,
mangers are also encouraged to consider the question of substitutes more broadly, to the
point of considering means for using less of an offering, use of a used version of an offering,
or even the choice to not use anything (Porter, 1985, p. 276). Within this range, it is
important to recognize that many competing technologies are in fact only partial substitutes, with lower performance on one or more dimensions important to some buyers (e.g.,
more hard drive capacity or a smaller physical size). The belief that innovation success
requires the failure of a competing substitute can lead to a myopic focus on dyadic competition that may actually be counterproductive. Even within a traditional framework, being
a disruptor can lower profits through increased price competition in attempting to steal
1

share (Adner and Zemsky, 2005). The challenge in predicting outcomes with the dyadic
competitive framework has even led some to question the value of disruption theory (King
and Baatartogtokh, 2015). However, choice is not restricted to head-to-head winner-take-all
competition, or retreating to defensible niches. When technologies are only partial substitutes they may each be best for a subset of possible situations, and for buyers who place
sufficient value on those unique situations the choice is not simply between either one or
the other, but perhaps both.
The dyadic-comparison single-purchase assumption is a very strong assumption that hides
viable paths for competing technologies. Whether comparing desktops to laptops, or digital
cameras and smartphones, the persistence of the legacy technology is not necessarily due to
offering greater utility than any alternative for a sufficiently large number of buyers (though
some buyers may buy only one), but rather that many buyers will buy both technologies,
using each when a particular offering provides the greatest utility.
This research opens up a new avenue for understanding substitute technology competition
by modeling how the ability to create value in the presence of substitutes depends on the
interaction between the preference structure within a given buyer1 and the range of technologies available to that buyer. I develop a utility function where an individual’s preferences
are decomposed into a range of situations where the importance of each technical attribute
is allowed to vary. Existing models of differentiated technology competition can predict
which single offering will create the most value, based on an aggregated utility function
(a single weight on each performance dimension), but cannot predict which combination
or combinations of partial-substitutes might create even greater value. A model which decomposes the needs of that buyer might predict a supplemental purchase in addition to the
single best offering, but may also predict a combination of products that does not include
that single most valuable offering.
1
Preference structure within the individual stands in contrast to the preference structure of aggregated
individuals, as in Adner (2002).

2

This model of partial substitute competition is broadly applicable to a wide range of industries. For example, over-the-air broadcast television using an antenna can be seen as
competing against streaming services such as Netflix. However, because the competition
offers a compelling alternative to cable, antenna sales and usage are increasingly common
with the rise of streaming services (Dixon, 2017). As focus shifts to value of an offering
conditional on the prior adoption, this model can also be applied. For example, while range
has long been seen as a barrier to adoption of electric vehicles, many families own multiple
vehicles. Conditional on owning one vehicle capable long trips, an electric vehicle may be a
viable supplement, to be used for daily commuting. In contrast, prior adoption may limit
the co-use of a new technology. Mobile payments, for example, may be particularly valuable
for those without traditional financial accounts, but the lower incremental value conditional
on prior adoption of credit cards may slow adoption for users of incumbent offerings. The
model can even be applied to relatively mundane purchases, such as when buying shoes.
Many people have multiple pairs, to cover their range of needs (e.g., work, casual, hiking),
and the purchase of an additional pair may depend in part on the incremental value of
the new pair, conditional on ownership of many other pairs, relative to the cost of the
incremental purchase.
In Chapter 2 I propose that improvements to increase standalone value creation (when considering head-to-head competition against all potential substitutes) may actually decrease
value creation when considering situations where the offering might actually be used as part
of a buyer’s technology portfolio. In situations where an offering would be used as part of
portfolio regardless of improvement (areas of strength), the full utility of any improvement
is realized. In situations where improvement would cause the buyer to switch to using the
offering as part of their portfolio (areas of relative parity), only a portion of incremental
utility is realized (the difference between new utility and the utility of the alternative offering). In situations where even the improved offering would not be used as part of the
portfolio (areas of weakness), none of the incremental utility is realized. This is sufficient
for realized incremental value to be lower than what is predicted by a dyadic model of value
3

creation, and may even cause incremental value to become negative. The differences in the
relative preference for each performance dimension across these situations can also mean
that improving performance along one dimension may maximize incremental value under
constrained choice, but improvement on another may maximize incremental value when
recognizing that buyers may purchase multiple technologies.
I also argue that adoption of a technology critically depends on the adoption history of
buyers, which constrains adoption in several ways. If prior technologies are on a similar
technology trajectory (same dimensions of relative strength), the new technology faces a
replacement challenge - incremental utility, given the prior technology for which the cost
has already been incurred, must be sufficiently high to justify the cost. This is a difficult
challenge to overcome, and can be seen in current markets with slowing replacement sales
for smartphones and cameras. If prior technologies are on a different technology trajectory
(different dimensions of relative strength), the new technology faces a supplement challenge
- incremental utility in areas of strength, given that it will be used only in a subset of
situations, must be sufficiently high to to justify the cost. This can be seen in the purchase of
a new camera, given the buyer already owns a smartphone with a camera. While incremental
value is reduced by the presence of a competing technology, this can be a lower hurdle
relative to what is predicted by single-choice models of technology competition, in that
the technology does not need to be good enough to replace an incumbent in order to gain
a foothold, but can instead provide sufficient value for a narrower subset of situations to
justify addition to a buyer’s technology portfolio.
In Chapter 3, predictions based on the model are developed. This is done through the formalization of conditional value, numerically illustrated, to show how the preference structure of an individual determines adoption choices, conditional on the prior adoption of
a substitute. More specifically, adoption behavior is predicted for buyers of fixed-lens and
interchangeable-lens cameras, conditional on observed indicators of preferences, and whether
or not they have previously adopted the camera functionality of a smartphone. In the sec-
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tions that follow, I argue that the adoption of a technology that is a more distant substitute
for some offerings than others will be associated with an increased rate of adoption for the
former relative to the latter. Further, I argue that greater individual-level variance in situational preferences will be associated with the adoption of more flexible technologies and
multiple technologies, to best meet their range of needs.
In Chapter 4, the predictions from Chapter 3 are tested in the context of the digital camera
industry, where many users use multiple devices, such as a standalone camera alongside a
smartphone. These predictions describe how demand might shape this opportunity landscape through the rise of partial substitutes. First, the adoption of a new technology (smartphone) that is a closer substitute for some technologies (compact cameras) than others may
shape future adoption decisions, inducing buyers to switch to the more distant technology
(SLR and mirrorless cameras). Next, measures of within-individual preference variance are
created, based on the range of subjects photographed, and the range of technical dimensions for those photos. Greater variance is predicted to be associated with more technically
flexible technologies (interchangeable lens cameras), and the co-use use of multiple devices.
These predictions are tested using a novel dataset of metadata from 100 million images
uploaded to Flickr, a popular photo sharing site. This rich data allows individuals to be
followed over time, observing not only their adoption decisions, seen in the initial use of
a new device, but continued usage over time, including the co-use of partially substituting
devices. In addition, this data incorporates detailed data on the subject matter of each
photo, measured through the application of machine learning by Yahoo Labs, and detailed
technical details for each photo, such as shutter speed, aperture, and focal length. These
data allow for multiple measures of within-individual time-varying situational variance.
Results are consistent with model predictions.

5

1.1. Background
The threat of substitutes has long been a fixture in the field of strategic management (e.g.,
Porter, 1979, 1985). Nowhere has this been more prominent than in the field of technology
strategy. While new technologies are important to the general process of creative destruction
(e.g., Schumpeter, 1942, 1947), the nature of each technology comes into focus when theories are developed to explain why some technologies (or their associated firms) fail despite
apparent advantage, or succeed despite apparent disadvantage. Supply-side theories have
explored the architecture of technologies (Henderson and Clark, 1990), the presence of complementary assets (Tripsas, 1997), and technical interdependence in the ecosystem (Adner
and Kapoor, 2010, 2014), but demand-side theories have also featured prominently in the
literature on the success or failure of competing technologies. These theories have considered how product variety can deter entry in markets with heterogeneous preferences (Eaton
and Kierzkowski, 1984), how over-supply of performance for less demanding segments can
create opportunities for disruption (Christensen and Bower, 1996), how the application of
technologies to niches with different preferences can trigger technological “speciation” and
creative destruction (Levinthal, 1998), how customer (and supplier) learning can lead to the
emergence (or not) of a dominant design (Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998), how the structure of demand can drive industry life cycles or disruption (e.g., Adner and Levinthal, 2001;
Adner, 2002; Tripsas, 2008), as well as addressing other related concerns. While providing
great insight into the processes of disruption, predicted outcomes often fail to materialize,
leading some to question the value of disruption theory (King and Baatartogtokh, 2015).
My exploration of technological competition most closely aligns with the demand-side theories mentioned above, but differs with a focus on the potential for co-existence of partially
substituting technologies even within a single buyer. Some of these theories describe a
transitory co-existence (e.g., Christensen and Bower, 1996), until a technology targeted to
one segment disrupts the other. Others allow for retreat into a defensible niche (Adner and
Snow, 2010), or competitive isolation where each technology survives to service a different
6

portion of the market with different preferences (Adner, 2002). These place a ceiling on the
market, with each technology taking a share of potential buyers, through the assumption
that each buyer will choose the offering best meeting their particular needs or preferences.
The assumption that a buyer will choose the technology best suited to their needs has a
basis in reality, and many historical examples to illustrate this. A newspaper, for example,
might rely on a single piece of equipment (or several of the same type) for all their printing
needs (see Tripsas, 1997, 2008). Other industries, however, do not necessarily require buyers
to purchase a single technology for all their needs, but allow for the purchase of multiple
partially-substituting technologies for their varying needs. An example of this can be seen
in computing, where the popular press frequently predicted laptops disrupting desktops, or
tablets disrupting laptops. Existing models might predict a particular winning technology,
or segmentation based on the needs of different buyers. Even marketing from within the
industry often treats the purchase decision as a single best choice for the offering best
meeting the needs of a particular buyer (see Appendix A.1 for an example). Many buyers,
however, will choose a desktop, laptop, and tablet, to use each when it best suits their
needs.
The intuition that buyers might buy multiple technologies that can also be seen as competing
or substituting technologies is the basis for the model I will develop in the following sections,
where buyers are defined by multiple sub-utility functions based on their varying needs. This
allows the identification of criteria sufficient for the co-existence of substitute technologies
“within” a particular buyer. Subsequent sections will focus on different aspects of the base
model to identify trade-offs in the choice of technological trajectories that are missed by
existing models, and explore how the adoption history of buyers shapes the subsequent
adoption and diffusion of new technologies.

7

1.2. Value creation and technology trajectory
When considering how substitute technologies compete against each other, it is helpful to
revisit a core idea from the strategy literature - the idea of competitive advantage through
value creation. Value is created when the utility of an offering to buyers exceeds the cost
(or opportunity costs) of creating that offering, with added value or competitive advantage when the difference between the two exceeds the value created by competing offerings
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; Porter, 1998; Macdonald and Ryall, 2004). Most valuebased theory on competition between competing technologies focuses on buyer preferences
and, by extension, willingness to pay (e.g., Adner, 2002; Tripsas, 2008). Formalization of
the value-based perspective have addressed questions about the sustainability of advantage
from a technology, the persistence of substitution, order of niche entry, and effects on prices
and innovation incentives (Adner and Zemsky, 2006, 2005).
These tools generally assume the choice of a single offering/technology at the buyer level.
This is typically also constrained to the purchase of a single unit for purposes of tractability
(e.g., Macdonald and Ryall, 2004; Brandenburger and Stuart, 2007; Chatain and Zemsky,
2011), even where “coalitions” of buyers are necessary to produce an offering (as in Stuart,
1997, where a focal firm has a choice of upstream buyers and downstream sellers). Greater
insight for how technologies compete often arises through some degree of multidimensionality with a vector of individual preferences across dimensions of technical performance
(Adner and Levinthal, 2001; Adner, 2002).
To explore the implications of a sub-utility maximizing utility function, first consider a
typical utility function for individual i, for offering k from firm Fk , with performance dimensions X1 and X2 , with relative utility weights β1 and β2 , respectively, and a diminishing
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marginal utility rate of α.

Vi (k) = W T Pik − ck

(1.1)

α
α
Vi (k) = β1i X1k
+ β2i X2k
− ck

(1.2)

While these models provide an intuition for how preferences might drive investment choices
in horizontal differentiation, and how those choices might affect performance, they are
constrained by a preference structure that does not allow multiple choice, based on the
varying situations an individual is exposed to. A computer buyer who values a balance
of technical performance and portability is not the same as a buyer who sometimes values
technical performance, and other times values portability. An individual vector capturing
total preference for each attribute cannot say whether the buyer will buy a laptop (balanced
preference for both), or a tablet and a desktop (sometimes valuing one, and sometimes the
other). It cannot identify the utility from each combination of offerings. By extension, an
individual preference vector, with a single measure of preference for each attribute, provides
limited guidance for how firms should invest in environments where choice between partial
substitutes is not constrained to a single offering. This intuition is formalized in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 : MODEL
The central premise of this research is that some buyers may adopt multiple competing
technologies. In the business-to-consumer space, this can be seen in the case of one buyer
purchasing a laptop, while another buyer purchases a desktop and tablet. In the businessto-business case, consider a hospital considering diagnostic imaging technologies. While
some might be close substitutes, a full service hospital might purchase equipment for Xray, CT, MRI, and PET diagnostic imaging, to use each as most appropriate. Neither of
these can be captured by the utility function in Equation 1.2, where choice is optimized
according to the aggregate weight on each possible performance dimension. To address this
problem, I propose a base model of buyer utility that is defined by varying preference for
each performance dimension across multiple situations, showing how this allows for multiple
technologies to co-exist in a buyer’s “technology portfolio.”

2.1. Joint value
In contrast to the utility function in Equation 1.2, disaggregating “situations” to create a
summation of situation-specific utility functions, as seen in Equation 2.2, significantly alters
the choice process.

Vi (k) = W T Pik − ck
Vi (k) =

S
X

α
α
(βs1i X1k
+ βs2i X2k
) − ck

(2.1)
(2.2)

s=1

Absent any information about joint utility, complementarity, or substitutability, a typical
assumption in value-based modeling is that creating the most value, relative to other players,
is a path to superior performance, with “added value” placing a ceiling on potential value
capture (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996).1 . This is often a reasonable and useful heuristic
1

With heterogeneous buyer preferences, in the absence of price discrimination, market-price effects also
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when comparing substitutes in a single-choice environment. A computer buyer might be
interested in the single device that best meets their range of needs. In this environment,
substitute threat comes only in increasing value, or W T P − cost, of competing offerings,
with increased W T P coming from any performance dimension. A tablet competing against
a laptop may increase willingness-to-pay for a buyer by increasing power or reducing weight
to improve portability.
With this alternative specification, however, buyers are not constrained to a single purchase
within a particular technology space. Pairwise comparison to identify the offering with the
greatest value creation is no longer be sufficient. Using Equation 2.2, the buyer who consistently values performance and portability (β1 and β2 ) across all situations can maximize
utility from a single offering, but the buyer who sometimes values performance (β1 > β2 ),
and other times values portability (β2 > β1 ) is maximizing the summation of sub-utility
functions, and may do that with a single offering (Equation 2.2), or with multiple, as seen
in Equation 2.4.
Joint utility function for S situations, with combined purchase of k and k 00 .
Vi (k, k 00 ) = W T Pik + W T Pik00 |k − ck − ck00
00

Vi (k, k ) =

S
X

α
α
α
α
max((βs1i X1k
+ βs2i X2k
), (βs1i X1k
00 + βs2i X2k 00 )) − ck − ck 00

(2.3)
(2.4)

s=1

One option might dominate when considering which offering best meets a whole range of
needs, in a dyadic comparison with each other offering. That decision can change when the
buyer considers what multiple technologies might meet their range of needs, and the “single
best” option may not even make the final cut. A buyer having a “technology portfolio,” a
term I will use to describe the collective possessions of an individual available for meeting
particular needs, whether considered/acquired simultaneously, or previously acquired but
become important (Stuart Jr, 2015), as some buyers may be priced out of their most value-creating choice. In
pilot simulations using pricing choice along with my proposed model structure the two were highly correlated.
To focus attention on what is new, I rely entirely on value-based modeling in this paper.
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relevant to a current purchase decision, changes that decision outcome. With multiple
technologies in a portfolio, the incremental (added) value of an offering depends on the
utility only from those situations where the technology will be used (where it is “situationally
best” - e.g., the tablet for situations when portability dominates derived utility).
Table 1: Parameter definitions
Parameter
Vi
k
s
X
β
α
c
WTP
∆k
δ

Definition
Value function, defined as individual-specific (i) willingness to pay minus cost
An offering, where a distant substitute to k is signified by k 00 , and an intermediate substitute
is signified by k 0
A situation, as distinguished by varying preference weights (relative to all situations, S) for
one or more performance dimensions
Performance along subscripted dimension 1... n (two dimensions used throughout paper)
for the subscripted offering
Preference in situation s for dimension X1 ... Xn , for individual i
Diminishing marginal utility of an offering (0 < α < 1)
Cost of the subscripted offering
Willingness to pay for, or utility of, an offering, captured in the non-cost portion of value (V )
Change in a performance dimension, for an improved offering (∆ > 0)
Change in cost, for an improved offering (unconstrained)

2.2. Incremental utility and added value
The implications of this function are key to correctly evaluating incremental utility and
added value. An individual considering the purchase of two technologies, rather than one,
will evaluate the total utility using the best offering for each situation, against the cost of
acquiring both technologies. If a buyer already has a technology in their portfolio, it has no
marginal cost. The implications of this are discussed in the following extension of the base
model. The value of a combined purchase for a buyer’s portfolio (e.g., offerings k and k 00 )
exceeds the value of a single greatest offering (e.g., k 0 ), which is to say Vi (k, k 00 ) > Vi (k 0 ) >
Vi (k), when the following is true.
S
X

α
α
α
α
max((βs1i X1k
+ βs2i X2k
), (βs1i X1k
00 + βs2i X2k 00 )) − ck − ck 00

s=1

>

S
S
X
X
α
α
α
α
(βs1i X1k
(βs1i X1k
+ βs2i X2k
) − ck (2.5)
0 + βs2i X2k 0 ) − ck 0 >
s=1

s=1

Subtracting Vi (k) to create necessary conditions for the purchase of a combination or a
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single offering yields the following, where value must be positive for the possibility for any
purchase.
S
X

S
X
α
α
(βs1i X1k
+βs2i X2k
)−(ck −ck )−ck00

α
α
α
α
max((βs1i X1k
+βs2i X2k
), (βs1i X1k
00 +βs2i X2k 00 ))−

s=1

s=1

>

S
X

α
α
(βs1i X1k
0 + βs2i X2k 0 ) −

s=1

S
X

α
α
(βs1i X1k
+ βs2i X2k
) − (ck0 − ck ) > 0 (2.6)

s=1

For a particular offering (e.g, k 00 ) to add sufficient value, given the other (k), to be chosen
over the single best technology (k 0 ), this simplifies to:
S
X

α
α
α
α
((βs1i X1k
00 + βs2i X2k 00 ) − (βs1i X1k + βs2i X2k )) − ck 00

s=1|W T Psik00 >W T Psik

>

S
X
s=1

α
(βs1i X1k
0

+

α
βs2i X2k
0)

−

S
X

α
α
(βs1i X1k
+ βs2i X2k
) − (ck0 − ck ) > 0 (2.7)

s=1

V (k 00 |k) > V (k 0 ) − V (k) > 0

(2.8)

Alternatively stated, Vi (k, k 00 ) > Vi (k 0 ) > Vi (k) when the added utility of k 00 , given k,
in situations where W T Psik00 > W T Psik , minus the incremental cost of k 00 , exceeds the
difference in value between offerings k 0 and k. This is to say that the added value of k 00 ,
given k, must exceed the value difference between k 0 and k, for the combination to be
superior to the single best offering.2 Offerings k and k 00 together may be more valuable
than either alone, as in this example, even though the combined value is less than the sum
of their standalone value creation. As partial substitutes, they are sub-additive. This also
holds if the most valuable combination also includes the single most valuable offering, where
the added value of the supplement (e.g., k), given the single greatest value creator (k 0 ) must
be greater than 0 (i.e., V (k|k 0 ) > V (k 0 ) − V (k 0 ) = 0), for the combination of k and k 0 to be
2
At this point, this is symmetric. The value of k, given k00 , must also exceed the difference in value
between k0 and k00 , or else the combination would not be superior. For whichever of k or k00 offers more
(less) standalone value, the gap between k0 and the other will be larger (smaller).
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more valuable than k 0 alone.
This is equivalent to the following transformation of Equation 2.7, which makes the importance of relative performance on each dimension more explicit.
S
X

α
α
α
α
(βs1i (X1k
00 − X1k ) + βs2i (X2k 00 − X2k )) − ck 00

s=1|W T Psik00 >W T Psik

>

S
X

α
α
α
α
(βs1i (X1k
(2.9)
0 − X1k ) + βs2i (X2k 0 − X2k )) − (ck 0 − ck ) > 0

s=1

α − X α or X α − X α must be positive.
For Inequality 2.9 to be true, at least one of X1k
00
1k
2k
2k00
α − Xα
α
α
Because at least one of X1k
1k00 or X2k − X2k00 must also be positive (based on the

symmetric equivalent of Inequality 2.9, where k and k 00 are reversed), the other must be
negative. If not, regardless of the β weights, Vi (k, k 00 ) could not be more than the greater
of Vi (k) or Vi (k 00 ). This means that X1k > X1k00 and X2k00 > X2k , or vice versa, for a
combination to be superior. This implies that horizontal differentiation is critical to supplementation by partial-substitutes. With vertical differentiation, the buyer would simply
choose the offering creating the most value for them, based on their preferences for absolute
performance weighted against cost.
Without loss of generality, going forward I will treat the identities k and k 00 such that
X1k > X1k00 and X2k00 > X2k . Thus, for W T Psik00 > W T Psik (situations where k 00 is
α − X α ) + β (X α − X α ) > 0 (the utility difference is
more useful than k), βs1i (X1k
00
s2i
1k
2k
2k00
α − X α ) (k 00 is disadvantaged on X ), and β (X α − X α ) > 0 (k 00
positive), 0 > βs1i (X1k
00
1
s2i
1k
2k
2k00

is advantaged on X2 ).
In a dyadic comparison, perhaps a desktop dominates a tablet, and the tablet offers no incremental utility or added value (ignoring cost). When considering a tablet as a supplement
to a desktop (it is not a compliment, because of negative cross-price elasticity - the utility of
a desktop and tablet is less than the sum of the utility of the desktop and the utility of the
tablet), attention shifts entirely to situations where the tablet is superior, and is ignored
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for situations where the desktop is superior, and added value depends on the incremental
utility in the former.

2.3. Innovation incentives
In technology industries, innovation is generally seen as necessary for ongoing survival,
whether incremental or radical in terms of performance (or performance dimensions), or
process. Improvements take place along a performance trajectory, defined by the relative
level of each dimension of performance, perhaps including cost, (Adner and Levinthal,
2001; Adner, 2002), with position on the trajectory defined by the performance along each
dimension in a given period. Value-based strategy provides a map for how to remain
competitive, through targeted efforts to maximize the gap between willingness to pay and
cost (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; Macdonald and Ryall, 2004). To the extent that
gap exceeds the value created from any other offering under consideration, value has been
added, and may be captured. As shown in the base model, however, the firm that creates
the most standalone value through their offering may not create the most value (or add any
value) when combinations of offerings are considered.
In this section I extend the base model to propose that investments that increase the
standalone competitiveness of an offering may decrease competitive advantage when the
offering is considered as one of multiple technologies a buyer might adopt in building their
technology portfolio. This could happen where investments primarily improve performance
across situations where another part of a buyer’s portfolio provides greater performance,
and increased willingness to pay in the remaining situations where the offering will be used
can’t justify the investment. While this idea holds generally, the specifics can depend on
whether the investment is focused on a dimension of relative strength, or relative weakness,
as the firm decides whether to increase depth in current area of focus, expand into adjacent
use-cases, or attempt to target all uses as a market leader.

15

2.3.1. Product improvement
When the ability to capture value depends on the possibility of being purchased into a
technology portfolio, this has important implications for investment behavior. Consider
Fk ’s various investment alternatives for improving k. First, consider an investment in
improving X1k by ∆k , with an increase in cost of δk .3

Vi (k∆X1 ) =

S
X

α
(βs1i (X1k + ∆k )α + βs2i X2k
) − (ck + δk )

(2.10)

s=1

This increases standalone value by the following.

Vi (k∆X1 ) − Vi (k) =

S
X

α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
)) − δk

(2.11)

s=1

Because X1k > X1k00 and diminishing marginal utility for improved performance, this increases standalone utility less than improving X1k00 by ∆k would increase utility. This
implies a marginal advantage to investing in areas of relative weakness (relative to competitors, holding supply-side factors constant), with any improvement at a lower point along
the curve of diminishing marginal utility. As shown in the next subsection, however, the
relative effect of investing in each area (compared against substitute technologies) can differ
when the offering is only one possible option in a technology portfolio.
S
X
s=1

α
(βs1i ((X1k00 + ∆k )α − X1k
00 )) − δk >

S
X

α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
)) − δk

(2.12)

s=1

In the subsections that follow, improvements in X1 and X2 will be modeled and discussed
as a discrete choice, with one improving an area of strength and the other an area of weakness. In reality, this is a continuous choice, where firms decide on their trajectory with more
or less (but not necessarily zero) improvement on each performance dimension. If a firm
3

Increments are considered to be constant across examples. Supply side factors that might make these
different between performance dimensions are outside the scope of this paper.
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continues on a constant trajectory, improvement in their area of strength will dominate. As
that trajectory shifts towards that of other buyer segments/competitors, investment proportionately shifts to improvement in an area of relative weakness. The discrete treatment
makes this distinction more clear, for the purposes of easing the development of intuition.
2.3.2. Product improvement in an area of relative strength
As shown in the base model, the effect on value creation for a combination being purchased
for a portfolio is not the same as the effect on standalone value creation. As opposed to the
value creation seen in Equation 2.2, the value creation of a combination with an improved
offering k is as shown in Equation 2.13.

Vi (k∆X1 , k 00 )
=

S
X

α
α
α
max((βs1i (X1k + ∆k )α + βs2i X2k
), (βs1i X1k
00 + βs2i X2k 00 )) − (ck + δk ) − ck 00

(2.13)

s=1

This increases the added value of k, to that shown in Equation 2.14. This added value
increases in two ways. The first part reflects increased utility to the buyer in situations
where k would be used in the portfolio regardless of any improvement, while the second
part reflects increased utility in situations where k 00 would be preferable to k, but inferior
to k∆X1 .
S
X

Vi (k∆X1 , k 00 ) − Vi (k 00 ) =

α
α
α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
00 ) + βs2i (X2k − X2k 00 ))

s=1|W T Psik >W T Psik00

+

S
X

α
α
α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
00 ) + βs2i (X2k − X2k 00 )) − (ck + δk )

s=1|W T Psik∆ >W T Psik00 >W T Psik

(2.14)

For situations where a buyer would already use offering k (regardless of any improvement),
the full value of any improvement is realized. In those situations, an approximation using
an increase in standalone value introduces no bias in an investment choice decision. Where
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preferences reverse (a buyer would use the offering for a situation only because of the
improvement, equivalent to W T Psik∆ > W T Psik00 > W T Psik , because X1k > X1k00 and
α ) > ((X
α
α
X2k00 > X2k , it follows that ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
00
1k + ∆k ) − X1k ), and 0 >
α − X α ). This says that while k is growing its advantage on X by ∆ , for situations
(X2k
1
k
2k00

where k was marginally dominated, but now dominates with the improvement, the buyer
experiences even greater benefit from the switch along X1 (experiencing an improvement
along X1 that is greater than ∆k , equal to ∆k + X1k − X1k00 ), but also loses performance on
X2 (losing X2k − X2k00 ). On net, the buyer does receive extra utility from this switch to the
improved version of k, but this improvement is less than what would be approximated using
a calculation of the improvement in standalone utility for those situations. This begins to
introduce bias when using standalone value to make investment decisions when in fact the
offering will be considered as part of a technology portfolio. This is because W T Psik00 >
α ) > β ((X + ∆ )α − X α ) + β (X α − X α )), which
W T Psik , so βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
s1i
s2i
1k
k
2k
1k00
2k00

is to say that the added WTP for situations where the optimal choice for which offering to
use reverses is less than the added WTP of the standalone offering in those same contexts.
This is because the portion of the increased WTP below the WTP created by k 00 in those
situations adds no value for the individual. Rather than realizing the full increase in utility
in these situations, the buyer only realizes the incremental utility that exceeds the utility
already available from other parts of their technology portfolio.
For situations where W T Psik00 > W T Psik∆ , which is to say situations where k will not be
used when part of the portfolio, despite any increase in performance, the added utility of
k and the incremental WTP from the investment remain 0, regardless of any improvement
in standalone value. This introduces substantial bias when using standalone value to make
investment decisions when in fact the offering will be considered as part of a technology
portfolio. When considered on a standalone basis, utility for this situations is increased,
while there is no increase when the offering is part of a portfolio.
Note that nothing in Equation 2.14 requires that the incremental value from the investment
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be positive when k and k 00 are purchased together, even if the value of the standalone offering
has increased. The added WTP from the investment for the standalone offering exceeds the
added WTP from the investment for the offering as part of a portfolio (Inequality 2.15),
which means the latter improvement may lower value creation.
S
X

α
βs1i (((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
)) − δk

s=1
S
X

>

α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
))

s=1|W T Psik >W T Psik00
S
X

+

α
α
α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
00 ) + βs2i (X2k − X2k 00 )) − δk

s=1|W T Psik∆ >W T Psik00 >W T Psik

(2.15)

For the investment to be additive to the combination, the incremental value derived from
improved performance X1 where W T Psik > W T Psik00 and W T Psik∆ > W T Psik00 > W T Psik
must exceed not only the incremental cost (δk ), but also the utility lost on dimension X2
where W T Psik∆ > W T Psik00 > W T Psik (Equation 2.16 - note the reversal of X2k and
X2k00 , as the negative value was subtracted from both sides). More concisely, any increase
in utility for situations where the offering otherwise would not be used, in an area of relative
strength, is offset by the previous advantage of the other offering in the portfolio, in the
area of relative weakness.
S
X

α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
))

s=1|W T Psik >W T Psik00

+

S
X

α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
00 ))

s=1|W T Psik∆ >W T Psik00 >W T Psik
S
X

> δk +

α
α
(βs2i (X2k
(2.16)
00 − X2k ))

s=1|W T Psik∆ >W T Psik00 >W T Psik

Taken together, buyers will realize the full utility gain from performance improvements for
19

situations where they would use a given offering even in the absence of improvement, will
realize partial utility gain from performance improvements for situations where they would
switch to the offering due to the improvement, and will realize no utility gain from performance improvements for situations where they would not use the offering regardless of
the improvement. Any incremental value creation calculated on the assumption of a standalone purchase is reduced based on the range of situations where use is contingent on the
improvement, or where usage will not occur regardless of the improvement. The standalone
approximation of value creation is increasingly useful as the number of situations where an
offering is most useful (within a comparison set of technologies in or being considered for a
technology portfolio) increases.
2.3.3. Product improvement in an area of relative weakness
At the highest levels, there are some symmetries in investing in an area of weakness to investing in an area of strength. Equation 2.17 mirrors Equation 2.10, showing the standalone
value of an improved offering. This represents an investment improving performance along
dimension X2 . This subsection will assume that X2k00 > X2k + ∆k , such that the substitute
offerings have absolute but different strengths. Absent this assumption, k would dominate
on both dimensions, and k 00 would have a lower WTP across all situations. There is nothing
about this model which precludes that, which would essentially transform the question into
one of vertical differentiation, but that would be moving beyond the scope of this research.
In contrast to Equation 2.12 above, increasing X2k for k by ∆k will increase utility of the
standalone offering more than increasing X2k00 for k 00 by the same amount.

Vi (k∆X2 ) =

S
X

α
(βs1i X1k
+ βs2i (X2k + ∆k )α ) − (ck + δk )

(2.17)

s=1

The value of the improved version of k, as part of a technology portfolio with k 00 , can be seen
in Equation 2.17, with the incremental value of the improved k, given k 00 in a technology
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portfolio, in Equation 2.18.

Vi (k∆X2 , k 00 ) =

S
X

α
α
α
max((βs1i X1k
+ βs2i (X2k + ∆k )α ), (βs1i X1k
00 + βs2i X2k 00 )) − (ck + δk ) − ck 00

s=1

(2.18)

00

S
X

00

Vi (k∆X2 , k ) − Vi (k ) =

α
α
α
α
(βs1i (X1k
− X1k
00 ) + βs2i ((X2k + ∆k ) − X2k 00 ))

s=1|W T Psik >W T Psik00

+

S
X

α
α
α
α
(βs1i (X1k
− X1k
00 ) + βs2i ((X2k + ∆k ) − X2k 00 )) − (ck + δk )

s=1|W T Psik∆ >W T Psik00 >W T Psik

(2.19)

As with Equation 2.14, Equation 2.18 is composed of two parts, with the first from increased
utility to the buyer in situations where k would be used in a situation, regardless of improvement, and the second part from increased utility where k would be used in a situation
because of the improvement. Note that while the improvement increases the performance
difference applied to β2 , this value is still negative. Rather than growing an advantage on
X1 as in the subsection above, the disadvantage on X2 has been reduced. As before, even if
standalone value of an offering has increased, the incremental utility from the improvement
may not exceed the incremental cost.

2.4. Investment choice
Investments in areas of strength or weakness must take into account where utility will
actually be realized, or decisions may be sub-optimal. This impacts the trajectory of a
technology, which may differ from what would be ideal under an assumption of standalone
value creation as the determinate of value capture.
The sections above describe how to measure incremental utility from product improvement,
for products considered in isolation or purchased in combination with another. If the firm
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is maximizing standalone value creation, it would invest in X1 if the following is true,
otherwise X2 .
S
X

α

(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k ) −

α
X1k
))

S
X
α
− δk >
(βs2i ((X2k + ∆k )α − X2k
)) − δk

s=1

(2.20)

s=1

If the firm is maximizing value creation when purchased in combination with k 00 , it would
invest in X1 if the following is true, otherwise X2 .
S
X

α
(βs1i (X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
)

s=1|W T Psik >W T Psik00

+

S
X

α
α
α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
00 ) + βs2i (X2k − X2k 00 )) − δk

s=1|W T Psik∆X1 >W T Psik00 >W T Psik

>

S
X

α
(βs2i (X2k + ∆k )α − X2k
)

s=1|W T Psik >W T Psik00

+

S
X

α
α
α
α
(βs1i (X1k
− X1k
00 ) + βs2i ((X2k + ∆k ) − X2k 00 )) − δk

s=1|W T Psik∆X2 >W T Psik00 >W T Psik

(2.21)
These simply state that when the incremental value from investing X1 exceeds the incremental value of investing in X2 , the firm will invest in X1 , otherwise X2 , whether the firm
is looking at standalone or combined incremental value. However, either of these being true
does not imply that the other is also true.
Across situations, the total individual standalone utility may be optimized by improving
X1 , while total utility as part of a portfolio may be optimized by improving X2 . This is
because of a difference in the situations relevant to a purchase decision. If a buyer will make
a single purchase choice, buying the product that maximizes their realized value across all
situations. Improvement for any situation (even if a very poor performer in some situations)
will increase willingness to pay for the buyer, which may make addressing weakness critical
for success. By contrast, buyers building a portfolio of technologies may be interested a
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more specialized offering to supplement something already in their portfolio, in which case
advantage might come from adding more value in a subset of situations.
Reversal, where improvement in one dimension is optimal for standalone value and another
for combined value, can driven by individuals who would reverse their technology choice for
a situation based on the improvement (with a reduced portion of incremental value realized),
or would continue to use another option despite the improvement (no realized incremental
value). As noted in the sections above, realized gains in utility from improvement are
the same for situations where a focal offering would be already be used. This does not
mean it represents the best avenue for increasing market power. “Transforming” Equation
2.20 so that it becomes Equation 2.21 requires subtracting the “lost utility” that is not
realized when the offering is part of a combination. This can be seen in Inequality 2.22,
which only holds when Inequality 2.23 is true. This requires that, for consistency between
optimal investment when assuming standalone purchase versus the possibility of portfolio
purchase, the “lost” utility from investing in an area of weakness exceeds the “lost” utility
from investing in the area of strength plus the difference in value between alternatives when
considering standalone value alone. Inconsistency is increasingly likely as more value is
“lost” from the “best” option (more of the gain comes from situations where the offering
is less preferred), less value is “lost” from the alternative (most of the value coming from
situations where the alternative is or will be preferred), and the gap between standalone
approximations of incremental value is greatest.
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S
X
α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
)) −
s=1

S
X

α
α
(βs1i (X1k
− X1k
00 ))

s=1|W T Psik∆X1 >W T Psik00 >W T Psik
S
X

−

α
(βs1i ((X1k + ∆k )α − X1k
)) − δk

s=1|>W T Psik00 >W T Psik∆X1

>

S
X

α

(βs2i ((X2k + ∆k ) −

α
X2k
))

s=1

S
X

−

α
α
(βs2i (X2k
− X2k
00 ))
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If an offering dominates in a narrow set of situations, but is only marginally dominated in
many more, improvement for the many situations may add more value than improvement
for the few. This would shift situations from the third part of either side of Inequality 2.22
to the second part. Rather than losing all of the incremental value for those situations, only
a subset is lost. This also shifts those situations into the “use regardless” category (holding
competitors’ positioning constant), for future increases in utility to be fully realized. It
could also be, however, that the many situations are not “adjacent,” with ability to increase
value limited to the narrower niche. In this case, those additional situations all remain in
the third part of either side of Inequality 2.22.
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2.4.1. Illustration of investment incentives
To give an example, a DSLR camera might provide the most utility in situations where
absolute technical performance is valued over convenience. Increasing the portability of that
camera might improve performance in situations where convenience is valued over technical
performance. Considered in isolation, willingness to pay has increased. Comparing this
against any other other individual offering, this offering has become more competitive. But
perhaps a buyer already has a smartphone with a high quality camera and, despite owning
a DSLR, would use their smartphone in those situations where portability is valued over
technical performance. While the DSLR has become more valuable in isolation, none of that
incremental utility is realized in those situations where the smartphone is still preferred.
If improved portability increases costs, or if competing manufacturers have focused on
technical performance, this firm may have actually decreased their ability to capture value
in this competitive environment.
When considered in isolation, increasing value for any situation can increase willingness to
pay. When considered in a competitive environment where buyers may purchase multiple
technologies, competitors have two levers for increasing willingness to pay. They can focus
any increase in utility on situations where they already dominate, or they can focus any
increase in value on situations where they are marginally inferior, with the incremental
value coming from the addition of new situations where the technology now dominates.
According to the model developed above, an improvement that most increases that standalone willingness to pay for an offering may not be optimal for increasing willingness to
pay for the offering in combination with other technologies. The effect of an investment
will depend on the relative importance for each dimension for increasing willingness to pay
in isolation, willingness to pay in situations where the technology dominates, willingness to
pay in situations where the technology is marginally dominated, and the relative importance
of standalone and combination modes of competition.

25

2.5. Path dependence
The section above considered individual decisions in isolation. Based on a given state
of demand and competition, what are the implications of alternative investment paths.
Taken together, though, several periods of prior purchases that are now part of a buyer’s
“portfolio” create critical path dependencies that will determine whether a new offering
is viable, independent of the standalone utility of the offering relative to the cost. That
path dependence may favor some new offerings over others. While any partial substitute
will reduce how much a buyer might pay for an offering, there may be a net advantage if
competing offerings are disadvantaged even more. If a buyer already owns a smartphone,
this will reduce the potential incremental value of a compact camera more than it will reduce
the potential incremental value of a DSLR camera. While the smartphone may reduce the
incremental utility of each, even if a compact camera might be preferred on a standalone
basis, the existence of a smartphone in the portfolio can lead to preference reversal between
options.
Path dependence also becomes important when considering replacement purchases. Over
the years, many buyers have purchased multiple cameras and/or multiple smartphones.
Because of diminishing marginal utility, ever greater performance improvements on existing
dimensions can be required to drive replacement sales. This creates the challenges seen
for many manufacturers currently, where it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify an
upgrade at a given cost, with each buyer reaching this point at different times, depending
on their overall willingness to pay for performance. At some point, the only opportunities
for maintaining sales will require attempts to capture share from rivals, or finding ways
to improve performance on new dimensions. In this sense, the broad interpretation of
substitutes as including prior versions of an offering also become relevant, though typically
ignored in most models of competition between substitute technologies. These intuitions
are formalized in the subsections below.
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2.6. Portfolio addition
The models above consider value created through the purchase of one or more items at a
given time, to illustrate how the purchase of a given technology may need to create incremental value, given another technology. This logic can hold whether that other technology
has been purchased previously or is being considered concurrently. However, given the
frequency of multiple technology purchases over time, it is important to think about the
implications of earlier purchases on later purchases. This serial purchase behavior introduces an important element of path dependence to any purchase consideration. As noted
above, in Equation 2.9 (whether k or k 00 is the focal technology), for an offering k to be
additive to k 00 such that the combination exceeds the value created by k 0 , the incremental
willingness to pay, from the subset of situations where the buyer would use k over k 00 if
both were in their portfolio, minus the cost, ck00 , must exceed the difference in total value
between k and k 0 . Taking ownership of k 00 as a given alters this calculation. In the consideration of k 0 , the cost ck00 has already been incurred, so the relevant consideration moves
to the full cost c0k rather than just the difference in cost. In addition, rather than taking
the absolute difference in willingness to pay, willingness to pay is defined by those situations where the buyer would use k 0 instead of k 00 , were it also part of their portfolio. The
realization of the full cost (rather than the cost difference) of the market leading option is
now relevant, creating a form of disadvantage. The relevance of performance differences in
situations only where k 0 performs better than k 00 creates a form of absolute advantage, in
that every advantage of k 0 is summed, with no reduction from disadvantage to k 00 . This
absolute disadvantage is reduced, however, if k 0 has greater overlap with k 00 than k. This
means that knowing whether k or k 0 would create more incremental utility if also purchased
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by the buyer (Equation 2.24) cannot be inferred from simply knowing V (k 0 ) > V (k).
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(2.24)

s=1|W T Psik0 >W T Psik00

In essence, this path dependent competition between k and k 0 requires a comparison between
V (k|k 00 ) − V (k 00 ) and V (k 0 |k 00 ) − V (k 00 ), or the added value of each, given k 00 . Ignoring the
constant, V (k 00 ), this essentially compares V (k|k 00 ) and V (k 0 |k 00 ). While the value of the
latter possible combination has been assumed away previously, for simplicity, it is not
necessarily a given that it will be less than the former.4 The relative preference between
these bundles depends on the individual’s preferences across situations. As described earlier,
for convenience and without loss of generality, offering k specializes in X1 while offering k 00
specializes in X2 , with offering k 0 treated as a generalist with a balance of each, at a lower
level (rather than a vertically differentiated specialist or generalist, better than one or both
across all possible situations). Conceptually, this makes k a better supplement for k 00 than k 0
(k and k 00 each have less overlap with the other than with k 0 ), though it still depends on the
demand structure. For an individual that places little value on X1 under any circumstances
(in which case k has little appeal, regardless of prior adoption history), but sufficiently high
value both X1 and X2 in some circumstances, the adoption of k 0 may make sense even with
high overlap with k 00 . As a numerical example, consider a buyer with β1 and β2 values of
(0,1) and (1,0), for two situations. This buyer already owning k 00 (strength on X2 ) would
have no effect on the relative valuation of k (strength on X1 ), but would lower the relative
valuation of k 0 (balance of X1 and X2 ). The buyer may buy either or neither, depending
on cost, but k would likely have the advantage. If the buyer’s preferences were (0,1) and
(0.5,0.5), they may buy either or neither, depending on cost and absolute performance
4
If this were not the case for some users, the latter bundle would become the relevant bundle for comparison in a simultaneous purchase decision, with the purchase of k0 a given.
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along each dimension.5 If the preferences were (0,1) and (1,1), k 0 , they may buy either or
neither, depending on cost and absolute performance along each dimension, but the odds
of an incremental purchase making sense have increased. Shifting the balanced preference
towards X2 would benefit k 0 over k, but would also reduce the added value of k 0 over k 00 for
that situation.
The consideration of k or k 0 , given k 00 , may seem trivial, given the arguments above, but
it highlights an important dynamic. Namely, even in a dyadic comparison between two
offerings where one creates more standalone value than other (in this case, V (k 0 ) > V (k),
as given above), the weaker option may dominate, depending on the current portfolio of a
buyer. By way of contrast, consider if the buyer had previously acquired k 0 . As standalone
offerings, k and k 00 specialized for different situations are both disadvantaged, with the
purchase of either not dependent on their relative value.6 Instead, the only criteria for the
purchase of either is their added value given k 0 . While this describes the contrast of a second
adoption decision from the first (whether an individual or joint purchase), and highlights
the critical importance of a first purchase for the evolution of other offerings, this pattern
continues for as long as further adoptions of any type continue, with implications for any
subsequent introduction of new offerings.

2.7. Replacement purchases
Prior purchases from the same firm act as substitutes that also affect the consideration
of new offerings. Many technologies go through cycles of replacement purchases, but replacement purchases depend on incremental value (whether from investments in areas of
strength or weakness) exceeding cost. Replacement purchases may also depend on what
other technologies are in a buyer’s “portfolio.” If an offering is running out of replacement
purchase runway, it can seek to disrupt others, or move in new directions (particularly if
being converged upon).
5

With no interaction term for X1 and X2 , trade-offs are compensatory.
This assumes there are no situations where both k and k00 would perform better than the balanced
offering k0 . As long as V (k0 ) > V (k) and/or V (k0 ) > V (k00 ), this will hold.
6
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As is taught in any MBA classroom, it is important to consider the question of substitutes
broadly. “Substitutes” can be defined to include purchasing a used version of a product
or choosing not to purchase at all (Porter, 1985, p. 276). Non-purchase based on current
ownership of a prior version can be thought of either of these, or somewhere in between,
but is certainly consistent with a broad conceptualization of substitutes. Replacement
purchases, or the purchase of something new to replace something similar, are critically
important in many industries, particularly once the market has been saturated. With the
increasingly saturated smartphone market, for example, many believe that most buyers in
the United States with an interest in having a smartphone already have one, meaning that
the only way for firms to keep selling phones is to convince buyers to replace their current
device with a new device (whether of the same brand, or a different brand). In contrast to
the idea of portfolio supplementation, where a buyer might consider using a new technology
in place of another only in a subset of situations, replacement purchases can be thought of as
replacing that existing possession across most or all situations. However, with diminishing
returns to any particular dimensions, development may shift in ways that encroach on other
offerings, as smartphones have increasingly encroached on standalone navigation, camera,
camcorder, and content consumption devices.
The mechanics of value increases through technical improvement to drive initial sales, generally, are described in Equations 2.11 and 2.14. With replacement purchases, the minimum
thresholds for any purchase increase to the willingness to pay (utility) of whatever the buyer
already owns. Modifying Equation 2.10, a replacement purchase could happen when one of
the following, depending on the trajectory of improvement, is true.
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Similar to situations where a purchase is considered given the buyer already owns something else, this comparison is against willingness to pay without regard to sunk costs. In
contrast, however, this value is considered for all situations where the legacy offering is
used, as long as performance is equal to or greater than the prior offering for all situations.
This representation considers replacement specifically, but the range of situations defining
incremental value could be narrowed by other technologies in the portfolio. In this case,
incremental value would be defined by the best performer for each situation, on the right
side of Inequalities 2.25 and 2.26. Reaching this hurdle is only a minimum threshold, with
replacement purchase decisions also taking into account other offerings. With use of a specialized offering limited to a subset of situations, encroachment by offerings applied to a
broader range of situations is possible, if not likely. For example, compact cameras generally
improve on only a few dimensions, for use in a few types of situations. As smartphones
continue to improve, they may increasingly be more valuable in some of those situations,
particularly in comparison to a compact technology that may be several generations old.
This further raises the hurdle for any replacement purchase of a compact camera, either by
reducing the number of applicable situations, or further raising the bar in some of those
situations, beyond the performance of the technology (compact camera) being replaced.7
The challenge of driving repeated replacement sales is as apparent in the model above
as in the real world. A given increase in performance on an existing dimension is less
and less valuable to buyers as the “base” performance for comparison increases with each
prior replacement purchase. Maintaining sales primarily through replacement purchases
(outside of products that depreciate) based on the same performance dimensions becomes
an ultimate Red Queen’s race, as any improvement to drive current sales just makes future
sales even harder to generate. This challenge increases if competitors can achieve footholds
in particular situations based on a different mix of performance dimensions. An offering
7

There may also be cognitive effects. If the smartphone is now used for birthday parties, and the compact
camera is only used for trips to the zoo, the new camera may be evaluated only for trips to the zoo, even
if it may also be superior to the smartphone for birthday parties. Such effects are outside the scope of this
proposal.
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k 00 may not create sufficient value to be added to a portfolio along with k, at the time k is
purchased (Inequality 2.27).
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00 − X1k ) + βs2i (X2k 00 − X2k )) − ck 00

(2.27)
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However, the development hurdle for supplementation by k 00 may be lower than it is for
replacement by an improved k. At the moment of first purchase, the value of buying a
replacement k, with no improvement yet, is −ck . Fk00 has a head start to capturing a
foothold as long as V (k, k 00 ) − V (k) > −ck .8 As soon as Inequality 2.27 reverses, with
utility of k 00 for the subset of situations where it will be used sufficient to justify the cost, k 00
becomes viable as a portfolio addition. This narrows the application of k to a smaller set of
situations, raising the hurdle for a replacement purchase. Given the cost of supplementation
by a partial substitute, there may be strategic value in designing a product to preclude the
purchase of others, though supplementation in areas of substantial weakness may only have
modest effect on the hurdle for replacement, particularly in early stages of an industry. For
a replacement purchase to take place, with a portfolio that also includes a partial substitute,
one of the following must be true, depending on the focal performance dimension.
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8

As with everything, this depends on the defined utility function, where a single discrete unit is used in
each situation. This has been consistent throughout, but bears repeating here. The same logic would not
apply if considering a second scoop of ice cream.
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As with the analysis of baseline portfolio supplementation, the decision is based on situations
where the buyer would use the technology, regardless of any improvement (now situations
where they use the prior version), and situations where the buyer would go from using a
competing technology in their portfolio to using the improved version of the focal technology.
Continued improvement of k on X1 may continue to increase willingness to pay in situations
where that dimension matters most, but over the long term performance on that dimension
may reach where further improvement can have little effect on willingness to pay. This would
indicate pressure towards competitive convergence (with a shift in trajectory towards X2 ),
unless a new performance dimension can be identified. This may not occur symmetrically.
For example, if situations where X2 is relatively more important also place significant weight
on X1 , but situations where X1 dominate would benefit little from improved performance on
X2 , it may not be possible to create incremental value in currently dominated situations.
This is dynamic described by Adner (2002), except that a specialist in X1 may not be
able to survive without replacement sales, independent of k 00 being sufficient for situations
where X1 is most important. Though the discussion thus far as focused on two performance
dimensions, the firm could also seek to improve k along a new performance dimension, which
might allow it to break into additional situations or continue to add value in situations
where it already dominates. While camera manufacturers have little hope of disrupting the
smartphone industry, for example, new niches are being found for using cameras in sporting
activities (GoPro) or in attaching them to drones.
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2.8. New markets
Situations where a seller is targeting buyers who already possess a technology that is a
partial substitute are pretty common. In developed economies, most buyers will have at
least something useful for meeting their range of needs, even if a recent innovation offers an
order of magnitude improvement in performance. However, buyers can also enter with no
prior technology adoption within a technology space. This could be based on cohort entry
into a market (e.g., new buyers who have turned 18, and have no legacy financial services
products), economic dynamism (e.g., the church of new venture formation in developed
economies), or economic development (e.g., the growing middle class in “bottom of the
pyramid” economies, where whole classes of offerings/services may be offered for the first
time).
While perhaps a special case, this can be very important for the adoption or diffusion of
new technologies. Financial services like Venmo may have limited appeal for older buyers
who already have a range of financial products, but when compared head-to-head against
those offerings by new college students entering the market for financial services for the
first time, the threshold for adoption is much lower. Similarly, in economies where landline telecommunications never experienced widespread adoption, the threshold for adopting
wireless communication is lower, and rapid adoption of later generation technologies might
happen without the market conditions typically required for disruption.
As a standalone consideration, the fact that a more innovative offering might have trouble
gaining market share with legacy buyers, independent of any traditional “switching cost,”
but do better with new buyers is not entirely novel (see many discussions of cell phone
adoption in the developing world for the most frequent example). But, if early adoption is
driven by these dynamics as opposed to typical assumptions about the unique preferences
of “early adopters,” it could have important implications for ultimate diffusion and evolution of technology. Crossing the chasm is not necessarily a question of meeting different
preferences that drive early/late adoption, but could instead be a matter of facing the same
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preferences in the face of legacy technologies in buyer portfolios after more rapid adoption
by those without such considerations. Given the frequent early adoption of new technologies
by younger demographics (e.g., Facebook, Venmo, Uber, AirBnB), it is critically important
for decision makers to be aware of how much of that is driven by unique preferences as
opposed to similar preferences but different adoption histories. This matters for new ventures deciding on an expansion plan, and incumbents evaluating the threat from potentially
disruptive entrants.
The implications of path dependence on adoption are also important when considering
the requirements for achieving critical mass. Holding target adoption constant, if early
adoption is driven by the entry of new buyers, the rate of buyer entry becomes a critical
factor. If entry is based on cohorts (e.g., age cohorts), demographics become important in
determining viability. If viability requires 5 million customers in the first year, but only
3 million young adults will enter the market over that time frame, a successful strategy
requires appealing not only to new buyers, but to buyers with legacy technologies in their
portfolio. This might require development focused on adoption based on standalone value
for new buyers, and adoption/replacement for a subset of situations for legacy buyers. If
viability requires only 1 million customers, narrower focus (for first adoption, as opposed
to supplementation) becomes possible.9
While most models of “early adopters” are based on unique preferences, my model does not
require that the preferences of early adopters differ in any way.10 Adoption can be driven by
the prior adoption, or not, of substitute technologies. Early adopters might be new to the
market (no prior adoption), or might have a history of adoption that favors the entrant (i.e.,
having adoption a more specialized offering like k 00 , instead of a more broadly useful offering
like k 0 ). If adoption is driven by different preferences, early adopters may be drawn to niche
9

Cognition can also play a role here, depending on the adoption rules of new buyers. Initial adoption
could be based on which situation(s) become salient first, what information has been received at the moment
of adoption, or whether the new adopter considers combinations of offerings, or follows a sequential adoption
rule.
10
This model also, of course, includes demand heterogeneity, but assuming that is the only difference
explaining early adoption may also introduce substantial bias.

35

applications that are irrelevant to the larger market, with additional diffusion requiring a
trajectory appealing to a broader range of situations. By contrast, if adoption is driven by
path dependence, and preferences are actually the same, early adoption might be driven by
value across a range of situations by new buyers, but diffusion to legacy buyers may require
greater focus on niche applications to create sufficient value in a subset of situations that
the value in those niches can justify the cost of supplementing their technology portfolio.
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CHAPTER 3 : HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The assumption of mutual exclusivity tends to focus attention on the adoption decision.
Even when recognizing that substitutes might provide a subset or superset of the focal
functionality, prior research has focused on whether one product or service supplants another
(e.g., Porter, 1985, pp. 273-276). However, even if an offering is adopted, the ability to
add and capture value depends in part on the possibility of co-adoption, as discussed in
the previous chapter. When technologies are horizontally differentiated partial substitutes,
each may be best for a subset of buyer situations and for buyers who value incremental
performance in these varying situations the choice is not simply between one or the other,
but perhaps both.
This chapter extends the model developed in the previous chapter developing predictions
for observable behavior. This is done through the formalization of conditional value, numerically illustrated, to show how the preference structure of an individual determines adoption
choices, conditional on the prior adoption of a substitute. More specifically, adoption behavior is predicted for buyers of fixed-lens and interchangeable-lens cameras, conditional
on observed indicators of preferences, and whether or not they have previously adopted the
camera functionality of a smartphone. In the sections that follow, I argue that the adoption
of a technology that is a more distant substitute for some offerings than others will be
associated with an increased rate of adoption for the former relative to the latter. Further,
I argue that greater individual-level variance in situational preferences will be associated
with the adoption of more flexible technologies and multiple technologies, to best meet their
range of needs.

3.1. Substitute proximity and indirect complementarity
The technologies which are the focus of this research are traditionally defined as substitutes.
The incremental utility realized by purchasing a camera is reduced by the prior adoption
of another camera or smartphone. The incremental value of an offering k, conditional on a
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partial substitute k 00 is shown in Equation 3.1.1 Figure 1 plots a numeral illustration, with
the value of fixed offerings k and k 0 conditional on a hypothetical offering k 00 , V (k|k 00 ) and
V (k 0 |k 00 ), as the performance of k 00 increases, using Equation 3.1.2 For the purposes of this
example, offering k can be thought of as an SLR camera, with relatively high performance
for photo quality, and relatively low performance for convenience and portability. Offering
k 00 can be thought of as the camera feature of a smartphone, with relatively low performance
for photo quality, and relatively high performance for convenience. Offering k 0 , a substitute
with a technological trajectory between that of k and k 00 , which can be thought of as a
compact camera, balancing photo quality against convenience. In this illustration, the
buyer is defined by two situations, each aligned with the technological trajectory of either
k (the SLR or mirrorless camera) or k 00 (the smartphone camera).3 As the performance of
k 00 increases, the conditional values of k and k 0 fall.

S
X

Vi (k|k 00 ) =

α
α
α
α
(βs1i (X1k
− X1k
00 ) + βs2i (X2k − X2k 00 )) − ck

(3.1)

s=1|W T Psik >W T Psik00

This figure holds the performance of offerings k and k 0 constant, so that the performance
of k 00 indicates performance relative to k and k 0 . The increasing performance of k 00 in this
static model is not time, strictly speaking, but can be thought of as time to the extent that
smartphone camera performance improves at a constant rate relative to SLR and compact
camera performance.
1

The conditional value assumes the presence of the partial substitute at no incremental cost, in contrast
to joint valuation, where the cost of each offering is incurred.
2
In this plot, X1k = 90, X2k = 10, and α takes a value of 0.5. The performance of k00 is defined as
X1k00 + X2k00 , with the ratio X1k00 : X2k00 equal to β21i : β22i , or 1 : 9 (proportional to Situation 2). Where
the performance of k00 is 100, on the x axis, X1k00 = 10 and X2k00 = 90. Offering k0 represents a fixed
substitute with a technological trajectory between that of k and k00 , with X1k0 = 50, X2k0 = 50. The
individual is defined by two symmetrical situations, with the preferences for one defined by β11i = β22i = 0.9
and β12i = β21i = 0.1. For cost, ck = 3, ck0 = 2, and the cost of k00 is sunk. The independent effect of each
parameter will be clarified by subsequent analyses.
3
Here, k00 is used to reference the previously adopted technology because the analyses focus on the relative
effect on two offerings, k and k0 , with k00 being closer to the latter than the former. This naming convention
seemed to be the best way to keep that clear in the mind of the reader.
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Figure 1: Preference reversal. Conditional and added value of fixed distant (k) and proximate (k 0 )
substitutes to k 00 , as k 00 performance improves. β11i = β22i = 0.9, β12i = β21i = 0.1, Xk1 = 90,
Xk2 = 10, ck = 3, Xk0 1 = 50, Xk0 2 = 50, ck0 = 2, Xk00 1 : Xk00 2 = 1 : 9, α = 0.5.

Compared dyadically, the unconditional value of offering k 0 exceeds the value of offering k
in this example. This can be observed in the conditional value plots where the performance
of k 00 equals zero. This gap is captured in the added value of each offering, which is also
plotted. As the performance of k 00 increases from zero, it reduces the conditional value of
both offerings, k and k 0 . It does this by offering increased utility across all situations, with
the majority of that utility realized in the situation for which it is best suited - situations
where utility is driven more by convenience than photo quality.
Until performance threshold p1 in Figure 1, the conditional value of each is falling at an
equal rate. The quality of the smartphone is improving, reducing the incremental utility
of a dedicated camera. Until threshold p1, a dedicated camera remains superior across all
situations, regardless of type - this is why the conditional value of each type is equally
affected. At performance threshold p1 the utility of offerings k and k 00 is equal in those
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situations where convenience matters most - the domain of weakness for k, and strength
for k 00 . While the photo quality performance of k 00 remains much lower, that disadvantage
is matched by superior performance in terms of convenience. Beyond threshold p1 , the
conditional value of k continues to be affected by an improving k 00 , but only in the area
where k is at a relative advantage. This introduces the conditional summation shown in
Equation 3.1, where W T Psik > W T Psik00 (situations where the utility of offering k exceeds
the utility of offering k 00 ). Prior to threshold p1 that condition is true for all situations.4
Once a smartphone is superior to an SLR for situations where convenience matters most,
continued improvement in performance for those situations no longer affects the conditional
value of SLRs. Improved performance for situations where photo quality matters most
will continue to affect the conditional value of SLRs. The overall rate of conditional value
decline will slow relative to k 0 , which continues to be affected by utility improvements for
smartphones across all situations.
The difference in relative rate of conditional value decline continues until performance
threshold p2 . Prior to reaching p2 , due to the higher rate of conditional value decline,
the conditional value of k 0 falls below the conditional value of k. Beyond this preference
reversal point, a buyer might choose to adopt the more distant substitute - an SLR - conditional on the prior adoption of a smartphone, even though the standalone value of a compact
camera exceeds the standalone value of an SLR.
At threshold p2 , compact camera utility equals smartphone utility for situations where
convenience matters most. As with threshold p1 for the SLR, the compact camera remains
superior in terms of photo quality, but this advantage is matched by superior smartphone
performance in terms of convenience. Beyond threshold p2 both camera types are equally
4
Where xk00 = X1k + X2k and X1k0000 = ββ12i
= β21i , the rate of utility increase for k00 is ∂/∂x =
11i
2k
√
√
√ β22i √
√
√
( 0.9 + 0.1)/2 x.√Of that rate
(0.1 0.9 + 0.9 0.1)/2 x comes from Situation 1 (k00 area of
√ of increase,
√
00
weakness), and (0.9 0.9 + 0.1 0.1)/2 x from Situation 2 (k area of strength). The values of k and k0 fall
00
by at same rate
√ until k √reaches√performance threshold p1 . Beyond this point, the rate of declining value
slows to −(0.1 0.9 + 0.9 0.1)/2 x for k (falling at the rate of utility increase for k00 in its area of weakness,
Situation 1). Beyond p2 the rate of declining value for k0 falls to the same level. The absolute rate of decline
is slowing for both because of the diminishing marginal utility parameter α, for the improving k00 .
X
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affected by any improvement in smartphone performance for situations where photo quality
matters most. At the point where the conditional value of k 0 falls to zero, it continues
to offer superior performance for situations where photo quality matters most, but this
incremental utility is offset by the cost of adopting the compact camera.
12
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Figure 2: Offering k always preferred. ck = 0.

While V (k 0 ) > V (k) independent of k 00 performance, beyond the crossover point V (k|k 00 ) >
V (k 0 |k 00 ). As long as V (k|k 00 ) remains positive, discrete adoption preferences for this buyer
reverse beyond this crossover. Prior to the crossover, the buyer would adopt the compact
camera. After the crossover, the buyer would adopt the SLR. The crossover in adoption
preference, observed in Figure 1 between performance thresholds p1 and p2 , requires three
conditions. If V (k 0 ) > V (k) was not true, as shown in Figure 2, offering k would always
be preferred. If V (k|k 00 ) > V (k 0 |k 00 ) was not true, as shown prior to the preference reversal
in Figure 1 and in Figure 3 offering k 0 remains the preferred choice. Finally, if conditional
value falls to zero for all partial substitutes, no adoption will occur.
These dynamics highlight an important implication of this model. While the adoption of
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Figure 3: Offering k 0 always preferred. ck = 4.

a new technology will not always induce preference reversal, when it does it will increase
adoption of technologies for which it is a more distant substitute relative to technologies
for which it is a more proximate substitute. In the context of the digital camera industry,
assuming that a smartphone is a more proximate substitute for compact cameras than it
is for interchangeable lens cameras (SLR or mirrorless), the probability of SLR/mirrorless
camera adoption should increase after the adoption of a smartphone.
Hypothesis 1: The adoption of a technology which is a more distant substitute for some
offerings than others will be associated with an increased rate of adoption for the distant
relative to the proximate.
3.1.1. Indirect complementarity in prior research
The mechanisms described here are very close to the concepts of indirect or compensated
complementarity previously used to describe the relationship between commodities. Indirect
complementarity exists when the presence of a third offering affects the rate of substitutabil42

ity between two offerings (Ogaki, 1990). Compensated complementarity is the realized rate
of substitutability, taking into account all direct and indirect effects (Samuelson, 1974).
Direct complementarity captures the rate of substitutability between two technologies considered in the absence of any other complements or substitutes, which in practice may be
an entirely theoretical exercise.5 The measure of indirect complementarity is the difference
between direct complementarity and compensated complementarity.
While the descriptions of direct complementarity, indirect complementarity, and compensated complementarity describe relationships in terms of price and continuously variable
quantities, this research is focused on value creation based on willingness to pay and cost,
and discrete adoption choice. While the analyses cannot be directly carried over, indirect
complementarity as characterized here can be seen where the adoption of a smartphone,
which is a partial substitute for an SLR camera, increases the added value of the SLR
camera (or decreases its value disadvantage) in the presence of a compact camera. This
could happen without altering the discrete choice of a buyer, as seen in Figures 2 and 3,
or prior to crossover in Figure 1, but could also lead to adoption choice reversal, as seen in
the regime beyond the crossover point in Figure 1. The analyses here focus on preference
reversal based on these changes in conditional willingness to pay, and where this is observed
it will be characterized as indirect complementarity or substitutability, depending on the
focal technology.

3.2. Preference variance, adoption, and co-use
While a buyer might adopt one technology over another, such as an SLR camera over a
compact camera, conditional on a third, such a smartphone, this behavior depends not
only on the nature of the technologies, but also the preferences of the individual. Returning
5

Samuelson (1974) uses tea and coffee as example commodities, where the rate of substitutability depends
on the price of lemon and cream. It is not so easy to imagine a direct rate of substitutability between an
SLR camera without a lens and a compact camera, as the former is useless without at least one lens. In
the example perhaps most relevant to this context, Samuelson (1974, p. 1255) describes enjoying cream as
a complement to both coffee and tea. However, if much more cream is used with tea than coffee, a falling
price for coffee can reduce cream consumption, despite dyadic complementarity - “an odd thing to happen
between so-called complements.”
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attention to Equation 2.4 and Equation 3.1, the value of co-adoption depends on individuallevel situational variance - the presence of multiple situations where a technology might be
used, but where the dimensions of performance which drive utility vary across situations.
The effect of situational preference variance is illustrated in Figure 4. The x-axis in this
figure captures situational variance as the ratio of relative preferences across Situations
1 and 2. Where

β11i β21i
β12i / β22i

= 81, β11i = β22i = 0.9 and β12i = β21i = 0.1.

the x-axis Situation 2 is held constant until

β11i β21i
β12i / β22i

β11i = β21i = 0.1. Offering k is characterized by

6

Across

= 1, where β12i = β22i = 0.9 and

X1k X2k
β11i / β12i

= 1, so that offering k is aligned

with Situation 1.
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Figure 4: Individual-level preference variance and V (k|k 00 ), at varying performance levels for k 00 , with
X1k X2k
β11i / β12i = 1. Where the x-axis equals 81, situational variance is high, with utility 90% determined
by X1 for Situation 1, and 90% determined by X2 for Situation 2. Where the x-axis equals 1,
preferences are identical across situations, with utility 90% determined by X2 for both Situations 1
and 2.

As shown in Figure 4, higher levels of situational variance are required to create value
6

Reminder: β subscripts are for situation (s), dimension (1... n), and individual (i).
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conditional on the prior adoption of a partial substitute. As preference trajectories, and
associated technological trajectories diverge, incremental utility increases.7 Because value
is only created when incremental value exceeds the cost of adopting a second technology,
situational variance because increasingly important as performance of the partial substitute
increases, as seen in the figure where higher levels of k 00 performance increase the minimum
threshold in situational variance necessary for for the co-adoption of k.
4
X1k + X2k = X1k00 + X2k00 = 50
X1k + X2k = X1k00 + X2k00 = 100
X1k + X2k = X1k00 + X2k00 = 150
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Figure 5: Varying performance levels for both k and k 00 .
Figure 6: Individual-level preference variance and V (k|k 00 ), at varying performance levels for k 00 , with
X1k X2k
β11i / β12i = 1. Where the x-axis equals 81, situational variance is high, with utility 90% determined
by X1 for Situation 1, and 90% determined by X2 for Situation 2. Where the x-axis equals 1,
preferences are identical across situations, with utility 90% determined by X2 for both Situations 1
and 2.

The challenge of creating sufficient incremental value to justify the added cost of co-adopting
is illustrated in Figure 4, with increasing situational variance necessary to create any value
7

The exception to this is where the performance of k00 is very low relative to the performance of k, and
where there is essentially no situational variance. In this case the higher performance of k, targeted for
Situation 1, makes it superior for both situations. This is what creates the spike in the dotted line on the
far right side of Figure 4.
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Figure 7: Varying cost for k.
Figure 8: Individual-level preference variance and V (k|k 00 ), at varying performance levels for k 00 , with
X1k X2k
β11i / β12i = 1. Where the x-axis equals 81, situational variance is high, with utility 90% determined
by X1 for Situation 1, and 90% determined by X2 for Situation 2. Where the x-axis equals 1,
preferences are identical across situations, with utility 90% determined by X2 for both Situations 1
and 2.

as the performance of the partial substitute increases, but trade-off is also affected by the
absolute level of performance for each technology, as shown in Figure 5, or the direct cost
of the supplemental technology, as shown in Figure 7. If the performance of both the focal
technology and its partial substitute are low, very high situational variance is necessary
to create any value. As technologies progress along different technological trajectories,
their differences in absolute performance along each performance dimension increases. This
absolute difference is what creates sufficient incremental value to justify the added cost of
co-adoption. Changes in the cost of a technology can act in a similar way. If the cost of
co-adoption falls, less situational variance is required to justify co-adoption. If each camera
costs $10,000, it would be very difficult to justify the purchase of multiple cameras, no
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matter how distinct each particular situation was. If the cost of each fell to $10, justification
becomes easier, holding situational variance constant.
While the incremental utility to cost trade-off can be achieved in several ways, importance
of situational preference variance remains clear as an important driver of potential coadoption. However, it may also play a role in single-adoption choice. Some technologies
are inherently more flexible than others. Sometimes this appears simply as a higher level of
maximum performance, as with processing speed in a computer, where maximum processing
power is used for processes which require it, but the processor can also operate at lower
speeds for processes that require less power. Other times, however, technologies may allow
for both lower lows and higher highs on a particular performance dimension, in ways that
matter. This is the case for digital photography, which is the context being studied. An
SLR camera will offer shutter speeds that are both faster than those offered on a compact
camera or smartphone (for example, keeping the sensor exposed for 1/1000th of a second)
and slower (for example, keeping the sensor exposed for a full second or more). As a
baseline, consistent both with the model presented and prior theory, it might be expected
that situational variance will drive adoption of technologies which are more flexible - in this
case, interchangeable lens cameras (SLR or mirrorless).
Hypothesis 2: A higher level of situational variance will be associated with the adoption of
a technology which is more flexible.
While prior theory and this model can predict the adoption of a single technology, this
model offers additional explanatory power with respect to co-adoption as a solution to
situational variance. This becomes particularly relevant for situations where trade-offs
between performance dimensions are binding, such as computer processing speed and power
consumption. In the context of digital cameras, this trade-off appears in terms of technical
performance and convenience and portability. Prior theory can only suggest adoption of
a technology which balances these needs (which may suggest a compact camera over an
interchangeable lens camera for some), the model presented here offers an alternative 47

co-adoption of partially substituting technologies for a range of needs. As shown in the
figures above, the value of adopting a supplemental technology increases with the situational
variance of the buyer.
Hypothesis 3: A higher level of situational variance will be associated with the co-adoption
and use of multiple technologies.
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CHAPTER 4 : EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND ANALYSES
4.1. Empirical Approach
The previous chapter developed several empirical predications. First, the adoption of a technology which is a more distant substitute for some offerings than others will be associated
with an increased rate of adoption for the former relative to the latter. Second, and also
consistent with prior models, higher levels of situational variance will be associated with
the adoption of more flexible technologies. Third, higher levels of situational preference
variance will be associated with the co-adoption and use of multiple technologies.
Context
The digital camera industry provides an opportunity to test these ideas empirically, based
on the nature of the products within it. Within this industry, there are several broad
categories of cameras. Interchangeable lens cameras, most commonly single lens reflex
(SLR) and mirrorless cameras, provide a high level of technical performance, but at the cost
of larger size and greater weight, together reducing convenience and portability.1 Compact
(also “pocket” or “point and shoot”) cameras offer lower technical capabilities, but are also
smaller and weigh less, increasing the convenience of carrying it around. Cameras embedded
in smart-phones offer even less performance, but are even more convenient to carry around,
to the point that they are nearly always available to buyers as part of a device that is
widely adopted for many other reasons. These devices reflect trade-offs that are inherent to
photography generally. The light captured by the sensor is a function of focal length (length
between lens and sensor), aperture (size of the shutter opening through which light passes),
shutter speed (how long the shutter is open), and sensor sensitivity (with larger sensors
being more sensitive). Each of these requires a larger size in order to maximize the range
of capabilities, and the ability to swap lenses further increases the range of possibilities.
1

SLR cameras reflect light through the lens to a viewfinder, using a mirror (shutter), which is flipped out
of the way to expose the sensor when taking a photo. Mirrorless cameras allow light to pass directly through
the lens to the sensor, with images typically previewed on a digital screen or through a separate viewfinder.
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An aspect of the industry that is particularly useful for testing this theory is that these
categories of devices are not mutually exclusive. Many buyers own cameras in multiple form
factors, using each where it offers the greatest combination performance and convenience for
their particular needs. While several of the constructs described above are fairly abstract,
the availability of data within this context provides several unique ways to test whether
the model presented can provide insight into how the world works. Broadly, this theory is
consistent with the idea that the rise of smartphones should be associated with an increase in
market share for interchangeable lens cameras, relative to compact cameras, as smartphones

Market share (% of digital cameras shipped)

are a proximate substitute for the latter.
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Figure 9: Interchangable lens camera share (North America, by unit)
Source: Data from Camera & Imaging Products Association

Data
The analyses rely on data derived from the metadata for a set of 100,000,000 photos uploaded to Flickr, sampled by Yahoo Labs for the purposes of training image classification
machine learning models (Thomee et al., 2016). The core dataset is composed of identify-
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ing information for the photo and the user who uploaded it.2 Two additional “expansion
packs,” or supplementary datasets provided by Yahoo Labs for the same 100 million photos,
were used to create the datasets for the analyses. The first expansion pack contains the
Exif metadata embedded in photos. This typically includes the time a photo was taken,
the camera make and model that was used, and specific attributes of the photo, including
size (resolution), ISO (a measure of sensor sensitivity), f-stop (a measure of the aperture),
exposure time, and focal length.3 The second expansion pack identifies “autotags” generated by Yahoo Labs to categorize each photo/video based on content, along with weights
of how certain their algorithm is about the subject. The unit of analysis for the combined
set is an individual photo, but transformations of the data aggregated data at the unit of
analysis required for each hypothesis (e.g., user-year or adoption).
The analyses take place from 2000 through mid-2014 for adoption models, and from 2000
through 2013 for co-use models, which are measured at the person-year level. This period
is particularly interesting as it captures the rise of smartphones. Concurrent with this,
sales (shipments) of compact cameras collapsed, as shown in Figure 10. The distribution of
person-year observations within the sample can be found in Figure 11. This reflects both
the growth of digital photography, as well as the decline in photography using standalone
cameras. With this decline, use began to shift from sites like Flickr to social media like
Instagram (introduced in 2010 for the iPhone, and 2012 for Android phones) and Facebook
(which saw the importance of mobile photography at around the same time, acquiring
Instagram in 2012). The sharp drop in 2014 reflects data availability for the first part of
the year only. Analyses that require aggregation of use across the year do not include 2014.
2

This data is sufficient to spot check photos online, to confirm the accuracy of the underlying metadata.
For example, there were some extreme outliers for exposure time, but each of those photos were examined
and determined to be long-exposure photos taken in low light conditions.
3
The f-stop is actually somewhat complicated, but is generally used to describe the denominator of a
ratio, where the denominator is the aperture, or width of the shutter opening (diaphragm). The area through
which light can pass can be approximated by π(aperture/2)2 , though the actual opening is an equilateral
polygon with n sides, where n is the number of blades that make up the diaphragm (more expensive lenses
have more blades, and better approximate a circle, which affects the shape of out of focus elements of a
photo). The full ratio is comprised of the focal length divided by the aperture, written as f/1.4, though most
would refer to this f-stop as 1.4, and that is also how it is captured in the metadata.
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Figure 10: Cameras Shipped by Year in North America
Source: Data from Camera & Imaging Products Association
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Figure 11: Person-year observations by year
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2012
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4.1.1. Dependent variables: Adoption and co-use
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict adoption decisions. Hypothesis 3 predicts co-adoption (co-use)
of multiple technologies. For the model predictions related to adoption, the dependent
variable is whether the adopted device was an SLR/mirrorless camera (1) or, alternatively,
a compact camera (0). The initial use of a smartphone is omitted, given the focus on
within-industry competitive dynamics. Thus, the analysis describe the relationship between
predictors and the dependent variable conditional on adoption. At any given moment, each
user can be imagined as facing a set of decisions. First, whether to buy a new device. If
that decision is yes, what type of device to buy. These analyses are taking place at the level
of the second decision.
Loosely defined, “co-use” within a year could be defined as using multiple cameras within a
year. However, this definition would also capture replacement purchases, where Camera A
is used for half the year, and Camera B for the other half. To measure camera co-use at the
person-year level, I created a list of cameras used by each person during the year, sorted
by the date and time each photo was taken (photo metadata being the source of camera
usage information). Taking the last camera used in the year, going back to the first time
that camera was used within the year, I created a co-use measure which indicates whether
another camera was used during that time. If somebody used Camera A for half the year,
and Camera B for the other half, no co-use would be recorded (a value of 0). If Camera A
was used, then Camera B, then Camera A, co-use would be recorded (taking a value of 1).
Note that this is based on the date the photo was taken, and not the date uploaded, which
would provide a biased picture of co-usage. If two cameras were used during the year, but
the photos from one were only uploaded at the end of the year (or even in a later year),
this co-use would still be detected by the measure.
Several relevant patterns can be observed in the sample data. First, if sales data is used as
the only measure of whether a technology has been displaced, displacement can be vastly
overstated, given use rates that exceed adoption rates for all time periods. Use of purchases
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Figure 12: Cameras Used or Adopted by Year
Source: Data from Dissertation Sample

as a proxy for use also risks systematic bias, as measures of use and adoption diverge early
in the technology cycle, and converge later in the cycle. Figure 12 also highlights several
limitations of this sample. Smartphone usage is clearly underrepresented in an absolute
sense (unit sales vastly exceed camera unit sales in the later periods), but likely also in
terms of the use of smartphones as cameras. This is not cause for huge concern, given the
focus on competitive dynamics within the digital camera industry - users that never used
a standalone camera are outside the scope of consideration. A larger concern is that the
sample of Flickr users is not necessarily representative of the population more broadly. Flickr
users are likely to be particularly enthusiastic photographers, with preferences that diverge
from the broader population. This can be seen in the differences in peaks for compact and
interchangeable lens cameras between Figure 12, of the sample for this study, and Figure 10,
for North America in total. This is also not a major concern, with the focus of this research
on the existence of a mechanism - indirect complementarity, which can be demonstrated
independently of whether the sample is representative. Care should be taken, however, in
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attempting to extrapolate any effect sizes from this study to the population more broadly.
4.1.2. Independent variables: Prior smartphone adoption
The first implication of the model indicates a relationship between adoption of a technology
(smartphone) and the subsequent adoption of technologies for which a smartphone represents a more proximate or distant substitute. This measure takes the value of an indicator
variable for whether an individual has ever previously used a smartphone to upload a photo
to Flickr (1), or not (0). The basis for this indicator is the assumption that the first upload
of this type indicates the continued ownership of a smartphone - assuming that the user
has not since gone back to using a feature phone (flip or candy-bar form-factor phones,
generally). In addition to being a plausible assumption, this takes into account that users
may use other sites (such as Instagram or Facebook) with later phones, such that they may
not appear to be used on Flickr even if the user continues to use a dedicated camera for
uploading to Flickr.
As a placebo test, an indicator is also created for users that have previously adopted only
a feature phones is calculated. As a very weak substitute even for compact cameras any
effect should be very small, if not indistinguishable from zero.
4.1.3. Independent variables: Situational preference variance
An association with situational variance is predicted both for individual adoptions and coadoption and use. While only the latter takes place at the person-year level, the calculation
of situational variance takes place at that level for all analyses. This is because consistent
measurement requires use of a consistent amount of time. At the limit, measurement at the
individual photo level would indicate a complete absence of situational variance. Situational
variance can be conceived of in two ways - with a greater number of situations, or more
variance in the needs between situations.
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Situations (S)
First, a larger number of situations (S), indicates greater variance in the subject matter
being photographed. A user that only photographs flowers can be characterized as having
“fewer situations” relative to somebody who photographs flowers, architecture, and people.
While this may weakly predict greater situational variance (βs), in that not every subject
matter will call for a different mix of technical attributes, it is also something that photographers may be more consciously aware of. In fact, it is common for buyers to seek advice
on a camera “for weddings” or ”for portraits,” even if the device is likely to be used for
both.
This measure captures variation in subject matter of photos by an individual. Each photo
in this dataset has been tagged by Yahoo Labs, using a machine learning algorithm to
assign subject tags and confidence weights to each photo. For example, a photo might
have the tags bridge, architecture, boat, and outdoors, with weights 0.9, 0.6, 0.2, and 0.8,
respectively. That photo will likely be outdoors and contain a bridge (a type of architecture)
and a boat, but the autotags are attempting to identify the subject of the photo, and not
just the contents - so the algorithm, in this case, would be predicting that the subject is
more likely the bridge than the boat, even if it contains both (perhaps because the bridge is
more prominent in the photo, or in sharper focus). Each photo is placed in n-dimensional
space based on these tags and weights.4
User-year variance is calculated by summing the eigenvalues of the set of photos in that
conceptual (tag-based) n-dimensional space, with the set defined at the person-year level.
Because each photo represents a single point, at least two photos are required at the personyear level for a value to be calculated. The less overlap there is in photo subjects, the greater
the variance for the person-year observation. This characterization of variance is most
analogous to the situations (S) in the sub-utility function model. More photos in different
areas of the conceptual space are analogous to a greater number of situations. Results are
4

There are approximately 1500 tags, but no individual photo has anywhere near this number of tags.
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presented using the raw measure, the measure winsorized (at the 99th percentile), and the
measure logged (of the summed eigenvalues plus one). The logged measure best corrects for
skew, but all are reported because this decision was not made ex ante. When effect sizes are
expressed in terms of standard deviations, effect sizes are quite similar (smaller coefficients
for the more skewed measure, but one standard deviation is much larger).
One advantage of this measure is that it can capture, to some degree, the importance of
convenience. A user with pictures of many different things may want to carry a camera
at all times, so that it is available when the mood strikes. This is not captured by any
technical measure of a particular photo. Another advantage is that it does not require any
particular technology to be revealed. While an individual who enjoys photographing flowers
may benefit from a macro lens, any device can be used.
Situational variance (βs)
Alternatively, variance can be conceived as in terms of the technical variance between photos. Photos may have a very short exposure, with a longer focal length, the reverse, or
a long exposure with a shorter focal length. Variance in these measures necessarily call
for differences in technology to address each challenge, whether a single technology which
flexibly covers the range, or a mix of technologies, where each has a designated purpose.
This measure attempts to quantify variance in the underlying needs by placing each photo
in a point in “technical space.” Four technical parameters were gathered for each photo,
using the Flickr Exif dataset from Yahoo Labs: ISO, f-stop, focal length, and exposure time.
Because variance is being measured in n-dimensional space, it is important to standardize
these dimensions so that no one dimension dominates the variance5 For example, ISO values do not typically follow a linear scale (e.g., 100, 200, 300), but instead increase through
doubling (e.g., 100, 200, 400, 800). By contrast, focal length is continuously variable (depending on choice of lens, a particular SLR camera might use any focal length between 16
5

Subject matter tags are already standardized to a 0 to 1 scale based on confidence.
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and 400 mm, with additional options for fixed focal lengths above or below that range),
and exposure time is linear but highly skewed (most exposure times are a tiny fraction of a
second, but there are very long exposures of subjects like the night sky). For my primary
analysis, ISO, f-stop, and exposure time are logged.6 Then all four are standardized to a
mean of zero and standard deviation of one. Observations where any of these variables are
missing are dropped.7
With all photos within the level of analysis plotted in technical space, summed eigenvalues
are calculated for each person-year observation. Because an eigenvalue requires at least
two points, person-year observations with fewer than two photos are coded as missing.
This measure, like the measure of conceptual variance, is highly skewed. Higher values
indicate greater variance in those attributes. Results are presented using the raw measure,
the measure winsorized (at the 99th percentile), and the measure logged (of the summed
eigenvalues plus one). The logged measure best corrects for skew, but all are reported
because this decision was not made ex ante. When effect sizes are expressed in terms of
standard deviations, effect sizes are quite similar (smaller coefficients for the more skewed
measure, but one standard deviation is much larger).
4.1.4. Statistical approach
All models use linear probability models and are, because some individuals are captured
multiple times for both adoption and person-year analyses, clustered at the individual level.
There are many factors that go into the decision to adopt one or more cameras, as well as
when somebody might adopt a smartphone. No demographic information is available at
the user level, and the license for the data prohibits attempts to infer demographic data or
match users to external sources based on the data provided. Instead, user fixed effects are
applied to all models.
6

Results are robust to every variation of transformations I tried.
The most frequently omitted measure is ISO. I performed the same analysis based only on the other
three dimensions, and results did not differ. For some photos, all these details are missing. This could
happen for photos that are scanned and uploaded, or if photos extensively modified in some photo editing
suites, for example.
7
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In addition to user fixed effects, models are also tested with and without year fixed effects.
This attempts to correct for general trends in adoption decisions. These models are not
necessarily appropriate where the general trends are themselves affected by the independent
variable. A central premise of this paper is that the broader trend in camera adoptions,
with a massive relative shift towards SLR/mirrorless cameras, is driven in large part by
increased adoption of smartphones. The implications for estimated effects are discussed
where appropriate in the results.

4.2. Empirical Results and Analyses
Before turning to specific results, I will briefly discuss the summary statistics describing the
measures used in these analyses, which can be found in Table 2. This sample starts with
1,853,295 person-year observations. Within this sample, there are 1,213,857 standalone
camera adoption decisions. There could be multiple within a year, or a user could use the
same camera for several years. Of these adoption decisions, about 45.76% are for SLR or
mirrorless digital cameras (collectively, interchangeable lens cameras), with the remainder
being compact cameras. This is reduced to a sample of 890,524 adoptions for which some
prior adoption history is available within the data (this omits all “initial adoptions” that
are the first appearance of a user in the data). Of these, 28.64% adoptions are subsequent
to the prior adoption of a smartphone, and 3.77% are subsequent the prior adoption of a
only feature phone (if a user has used both, they are counted as smartphone adopters).
Returning to the person-year unit of analysis, there are 1,682,376 person-year observations
with enough data to measure co-use and preference variance in conceptual space (which
requires multiple photos within the observation-unit with camera identifying information).
Of these person-year observations, 33.92% of person-year observations include the co-use of
multiple device (at least once cycle from one device to another, and then back to the first).
In terms of preference variance in conceptual space, as noted earlier, the raw measure and
winsorized measures are highly skewed, with means of about 4.6, over a range from 0 to
28.3565 and 11.7348, respectively. When the raw measure (plus one) is logged, the mean is
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1.6572, over a range from 0 to 3.3795. The person-year sample that includes measures of
preference variance in technical space falls to 1,421,568, as photos with missing Exif data
reduce the sample. Again, measures of variance in technical space are highly skewed. For
the raw and winsorized measures, with means of about 2.2, values range from 0 to 124.5471
and 10.631, respectively. With the raw measure (plus one) logged, the mean is 1.0176, and
values range from 0 to 4.8327.
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable
Observations
Year
1853295
Adopt Mirrorless/SLR
1213857
Prior Adopt Smartphone
890524
Prior Adopt Feature Phone
890524
Co-use
1682376
Conceptual Σ Eigval
1682376
Conceptual Σ Eigval Winsorized 99% 1682376
Conceptual Log(Σ Eival + 1)
1682376
Technical Σ Eigval
1421568
Technical Σ Eigval Winsorized 99%
1421568
Technical Log(Σ Eival + 1)
1421568

M ean
2009.272
0.4576
0.2864
0.0377
0.3392
4.644
4.6295
1.6572
2.2221
2.1693
1.0176

Std.Dev. M in
2.8126 2000
0.4982
0
0.4521
0
0.1905
0
0.4734
0
2.1884
0
2.1279
0
0.3906
0
2.2744
0
1.8706
0
0.5257
0

M ax
2014
1
1
1
1
28.3565
11.7348
3.3795
124.5471
10.631
4.8327

A correlation table can be found in Table 3. As discussed above, all models are linear
probability models, with user fixed effects, errors clustered at the user level, and year fixed
effects where noted.
4.2.1. Substitute proximity and indirect complementarity
The first hypothesis based on the model above is that the adoption of a technology which is a
more distant substitute for some offerings than others will be associated with an increased
rate of adoption for the former relative to the latter. In this context, this argues that
smartphone adoption will be associated with an increased probability of SLR/mirrorless
camera adoption, relative to compact camera adoption. Results are shown in (Table 4), for
smartphones (models 1 and 3), and the feature phone (e.g., flip phone) placebo treatment
(models 2 and 4), without (models 1 and 2) and with (models 3 and 4) year fixed effects.
All models include individual fixed effects, with errors clustered at the individual level.
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Variables
Adopt Mirrorless/SLR
Prior Adopt Smartphone
Prior Adopt Feature Phone
Co-use
Conceptual Σ Eigval
Conceptual Σ Eigval Winsorized 99%
Conceptual Log(Σ Eival + 1)
Technical Σ Eigval
Technical Σ Eigval Winsorized 99%
Technical Log(Σ Eival + 1)

Year
0.265
0.324
−0.041
0.013
0.273
0.275
0.253
0.125
0.147
0.178

Prior Adopt
Smartphone

−0.103
0.108
0.055
0.057
0.070
0.023
0.035
0.070

Adopt
Mirrorless/SLR
0.024
−0.036
−0.048
0.081
0.080
0.066
0.217
0.247
0.263
0.027
−0.024
−0.024
−0.017
−0.017
−0.018
−0.013

Prior Adopt
Feature Phone

−0.054
−0.051
−0.021
0.033
0.050
0.100

Co-use

0.997
0.964
0.218
0.245
0.253

Conceptual
Σ Eigval

Table 3: Cross-correlation table

0.969
0.219
0.247
0.256

Conceptual Σ Eigval
Winsorized 99%

0.218
0.248
0.268

Conceptual
Log(Σ Eival + 1)

0.928
0.878

Technical
Σ Eigval

0.948

Technical Σ Eigval
Winsorized 99%

Table 4: Smartphone adoption and SLR/Mirrorless camera adoption

Prior Smartphone Adopt

(1)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.1507∗∗∗
(0.0028)

Prior Feature Phone Adopt
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Year FE
User FE

651863
0.468
0.209
No
Y es

(2)
SLR/Mirrorless

0.0342∗∗∗
(0.0068)
651863
0.462
0.200
No
Y es

(3)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.0127∗∗∗
(0.0033)

651863
0.481
0.228
Y es
Y es

(4)
SLR/Mirrorless

−0.0033
(0.0064)
651863
0.481
0.228
Y es
Y es

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered at user level.

Results are consistent with the model, in that the prior adoption of a smartphone is associated with an increased conditional probability of adopting an SLR/mirrorless camera.
Models using the placebo treatment - prior adoption of a feature phone - find much smaller
or insignificant effects. The significant coefficient on model 2, however, may indicate the
presence of omitted variable bias.8 Particularly likely is bias introduced based on technological factors that change over time. This calls for year fixed effects. The challenge
with interpreting the models with year fixed effects is that they control for a general trend
which is arguably driven in large part by the treatment variable.9 Because the relationship
between the variable of interest and the proxy is positive, the true effect size should be
somewhere between the effects estimated with and without the proxy control. Comparing
the effects shown in Models 1 and 3 in Table 4, this range is quite large. These are linear
probability models, so the effect sizes are additive changes in the conditional probability
of adopting an interchangeable lens camera. For reference, within this sample the baseline
(average) probability is 0.4576, so the prior adoption of a smartphone is associated with
an increased conditional probability of adopting an interchangeable lens camera by 3% to
33%. As noted above, care should be made in any attempt to extrapolate these effect sizes
8

It would be shocking if there were not.
Angrist and Pischke (2008) would call this a “bad control,” through a proxy variable , while Dell et al.
(2014) would describe this as “over-controlling.”
9
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to the general population, but this introduces additional concern about the magnitude of
any relationship.
Because all models incorporate user fixed effects, these results indicate that users are more
likely to adopt an SLR/mirrorless camera after they have adopted a smartphone than before.
This analysis requires a change in behavior, so this coefficient specifically captures switching
from a compact camera to an SLR or mirrorless camera after the adoption of a smartphone.
Given the interest in the existence of this pattern, rather than its universality, the model
does provide an explanation for the observed behavior.10
4.2.2. Situational variance, adoption, and co-use
The second and third hypotheses based on the model argued for a positive relationship
between situational variance and the adoption of more flexible technologies and the coadoption and use of multiple technologies.
Adoption of more flexible technologies
The second hypothesis based on the model is that increased situational variance will be
associated with the adoption of more flexible technologies. This is consistent both with
prior theory and the new model. The question is whether the new model adds additional
insight. First, however, the results of the test of this hypothesis are provided in Table 5.
While results are positive for models that omit year fixed effects, these effects vanish with
the inclusion of year fixed effects. While models without year fixed effects are reported in
the interest of consistency, the bias described above for models using smartphone adoption
as a predictor is not a concern here. These results do not provide support for the idea that
subject-matter situational variance drives the adoption of more flexible devices. This could
10

This use of language is intentional. While the data allow for the observation of behavior that is consistent
with the model, this is not a true test. If the theorized behavior were not observed, it could just as easily
be argued that the underlying conditions were more like those plotted in Figure 2 or 3. In fact, Figure 3
likely characterizes the majority of camera users, seen in the decrease in compact camera adoptions that
is substantially larger than any increase in SLR/mirrorless camera adoptions, which always represented a
smaller market by units sold.
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indicate that this type of situational variance is not associated with variance in underlying
needs, or that this type of variance calls for a flexibility not present in the most technical
flexible technologies (e.g., subject-matter variance may equally call for convenience in a
camera that is always available).
Table 5: Situations (S) and SLR/Mirrorless camera adoption
(1)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.0158∗∗∗
(0.0006)

Σ S Eigval

(2)
SLR/Mirrorless

Σ S Eigval (Winsorized 99%)

(4)
SLR/Mirrorless
−0.0005
(0.0006)

0.0169∗∗∗
(0.0006)

Log(Σ S Eigval + 1)
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Year FE
User FE

(3)
SLR/Mirrorless

1061505
0.500
0.216
No
Y es

1061505
0.500
0.216
No
Y es

(5)
SLR/Mirrorless

(6)
SLR/Mirrorless

−0.0004
(0.0006)
0.0925∗∗∗
(0.0030)
1061505
0.500
0.216
No
Y es

1061505
0.521
0.249
Y es
Y es

1061505
0.521
0.249
Y es
Y es

−0.0048
(0.0031)
1061505
0.521
0.249
Y es
Y es

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered at user level.

This hypothesis is also tested with an alternative measure of situational variance which
better captures variance in underlying need. This construct for situational variance (βs) is
measured using the technical aspects underlying each photo. Results are reported in Table
5. These results align much more closely with the behavior predicted by the model and
prior theory. In Model 5, a 1 SD increase in variance is associated with an increase in the
conditional probability of interchangable lens camera adoption of 0.0752, for an increase
of 16.4%. In Model 6, a 1 SD increase in variance is associated with an increase in the
conditional probability of interchangable lens camera adoption of 0.0839, for an increase of
18.3%. This model does provide support for the idea that underlying preferences, including
the need for technical flexibility, to shape adoption behavior.
In the next model, situational variance (S) is combined with the indicator of prior smartphone adoption, to provide some insight into the robustness of both results. Note that the
reintroduction of this smartphone indicator brings in the concerns about bias introduced
by the year fixed effects, so that true effect sizes should be between those shown. These
results, shown in Table 7, indicate little change in effect size for prior smartphone adoption.
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Table 6: Situational variance βs and Mirrorless/SLR camera adoption
(1)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.0359∗∗∗
(0.0011)

Σ βs Eigval

(2)
SLR/Mirrorless

Σ βs Eigval (Winsorized 99%)

(4)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.0277∗∗∗
(0.0009)

0.0522∗∗∗
(0.0007)

Log(Σ βs Eigval + 1)
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Year FE
User FE

(3)
SLR/Mirrorless

930975
0.507
0.223
No
Y es

930975
0.510
0.228
No
Y es

(5)
SLR/Mirrorless

(6)
SLR/Mirrorless

0.0402∗∗∗
(0.0006)
0.2116∗∗∗
(0.0023)
930975
0.513
0.233
No
Y es

930975
0.520
0.244
Y es
Y es

930975
0.522
0.247
Y es
Y es

0.1596∗∗∗
(0.0022)
930975
0.523
0.248
Y es
Y es

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered at user level.

This measure of situational variance does become positive and significant in models 1 and
3, indicating that there may be some predictive power in this construct when combined
with a measure of prior adoption of partial substitutes (which would not be predicted as a
necessary control by prior models). The effect size of situational variance is no interpretable
in models 2 and 4, as the placebo should not be provide any meaningful variance.
Table 7: Situations (S), smartphone adoption, and SLR/Mirrorless camera adoption

Prior Smartphone Adopt

(1)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.1434∗∗∗
(0.0029)

(2)
SLR/Mirrorless

Prior Feature Phone Adopt
Log(Σ S Eigval + 1)

0.0357∗∗∗
(0.0067)
0.0537∗∗∗
(0.0040)
651863
0.469
0.209
No
Y es

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Year FE
User FE

(3)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.0129∗∗∗
(0.0033)

0.0932∗∗∗
(0.0040)
651863
0.463
0.202
No
Y es

(4)
SLR/Mirrorless

−0.0034
(0.0064)
0.0144∗∗∗
(0.0041)
651863
0.481
0.228
Y es
Y es

−0.0141∗∗∗
(0.0041)
651863
0.481
0.228
Y es
Y es

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered at user level.

Finally, situational variance (βs) is combined with prior smartphone adoption, as shown in
Table 8 The estimated coefficients for smartphone adoption do fall somewhat, relative to
prior estimates. But, again, results are consistent with the predictions of the model, that
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path dependence and situational variance predict adoption choice.
Table 8: Situational variance βs, smartphone adoption, and Mirrorless/SLR camera adoption

Prior Smartphone Adopt

(1)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.1087∗∗∗
(0.0030)

(2)
SLR/Mirrorless

Prior Feature Phone Adopt
Log(Σ βs Eigval + 1)

0.2040∗∗∗
(0.0028)
590102
0.478
0.217
No
Y es

(4)
SLR/Mirrorless

−0.0071
(0.0068)

0.0076
(0.0070)
0.1908∗∗∗
(0.0028)
590102
0.481
0.222
No
Y es

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Year FE
User FE

(3)
SLR/Mirrorless
0.0081∗∗
(0.0035)

0.1610∗∗∗
(0.0027)
590102
0.488
0.232
Y es
Y es

0.1611∗∗∗
(0.0027)
590102
0.488
0.232
Y es
Y es

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered at user level.

Situational variance and co-adoption/use
The third hypothesis argued for a positive relationship between situational variance the
co-adoption and use of multiple technologies. As above, this variance can be conceptualized
as more situations (S) or greater situational variance (βs). Results for situations (S) are
reported first, in Table 9. Again, there is no reason to believe year fixed effects would bias
the results, so the models with year fixed effects are likely to be more reliable. Given a
base rate probability of co-use of 0.3392, a 1 SD increase in situations (S) associated with
a 25% increased probability of co-use (Model 6). This result is sensitive to the skew of the
underlying measure (a 1 SD increase in the winsorized measure is associated with only a
2.7% increase in co-use probability).
Shifting, again, to situational variance (βs) as measured by underlying technical variance,
results are shown in Table 10. As with adoption choice, results are much stronger when
using situational variance (βs) instead of situations (S). Model 5 indicates that a 1 SD
increase in variance is associated with an increase in the probability of co-use of 0.0421, or
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Table 9: Situations (S) and device co-use
(1)
Co-use
0.0063∗∗∗
(0.0004)

Σ S Eigval

(2)
Co-use

Σ S Eigval (Winsorized 99%)

(3)
Co-use

(4)
Co-use
0.0010∗∗∗
(0.0004)

(5)
Co-use

0.0076∗∗∗
(0.0004)

Log(Σ S Eigval + 1)
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Year FE
User FE

1682376
0.480
0.305
No
Y es

1682376
0.480
0.305
No
Y es

(6)
Co-use

0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0004)
0.0857∗∗∗
(0.0021)
1682376
0.481
0.307
No
Y es

1682376
0.502
0.335
Y es
Y es

1682376
0.502
0.335
Y es
Y es

0.0522∗∗∗
(0.0021)
1682376
0.503
0.336
Y es
Y es

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01

Linear probability model.

a 12.4% increase, while Model 6 indicates an increase of 0.0651, or a 19.2% increase.
Table 10: Technical space variance and device co-use
(1)
Co-use
0.0182∗∗∗
(0.0005)

Σ Eigval
Σ Eigval (Winsorized 99%)

(2)
Co-use

1421568
0.513
0.343
No
Y es

1421568
0.515
0.346
No
Y es

p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

(5)
Co-use

(6)
Co-use

0.0225∗∗∗
(0.0005)
0.1545∗∗∗
(0.0018)
1421568
0.521
0.354
No
Y es

Standard errors in parentheses
∗

(4)
Co-use
0.0137∗∗∗
(0.0005)

0.0294∗∗∗
(0.0005)

Log(Σ Eigval + 1)
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Year FE
User FE

(3)
Co-use

p < 0.01

Linear probability model. Standard errors clustered at user level.
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1421568
0.527
0.362
Y es
Y es

1421568
0.528
0.364
Y es
Y es

0.1238∗∗∗
(0.0018)
1421568
0.532
0.369
Y es
Y es

CHAPTER 5 : DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The central premise of this research is that buyers may adopt partial substitutes, which are
not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that this can drive competitive dynamics that might
be missed using existing models of competition. Competition between two technologies
depends not only on demand for the relative performance attributes of each offering, but
on the existence of partial substitutes which may differentially affect demand for the focal
technologies. More specifically, the introduction of a new technology may induce buyers to
shift future adoption decisions away from closer substitutes, to more distant substitutes, due
to indirect complementarity. Individual-level situational preference heterogeneity also plays
an important role, both in the adoption of individual devices or the decision to co-adopt
partial substitutes, as individual adoption behavior is shaped by their range of needs.
Evidence for the usefulness of this theory was found in the digital camera industry, where
a unique dataset allowed for the observation of individual adoption and use over time. In
this context, individuals are more likely to adopt an SLR or mirrorless camera after they
have adopted a smartphone. This behavior is also shaped by situational variance, as users
who are exposed to more situations, and particularly users whose needs indicate greater
variance in technical needs across situations, are more likely to adopt technologies with
greater technical flexibility, as predicted by this and prior models. Critically, this model
also explains why these users are also more likely to adopt multiple technologies, given their
situational variance.
This research opens up a new avenue for understanding substitute technology competition
beyond a binary choice between offerings, but as a domain where managers can also pursue
strategies that allow for buyer adoption even if a competing offering has already been
selected. Beyond highlighting the fact that substitutes do not need to be conceived only
as mutually exclusive offerings, this research highlights one mechanism that drives the
possibility of co-adoption - a range of needs which can be met either by a single offering,
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or a combination of offerings. These dynamics also point to opportunities for competitive
positions that may exist only because of partial substitutes. One example of this might
be tablet computers, which can be designed for a very narrow set of needs in part because
most buyers own multiple computing devices to cover their range of other needs.
While this analysis focused on the technology level, and how the rise of a substitute can
create position-specific opportunities or threats, there are also clear implications for firms
in considering the horizontal scope of their offerings, where thinking must expand beyond
segmentation and complements, to consider partial substitutes that might offer particularly
attractive combinations for meeting a range of needs. These dynamics also open paths for
prolonging survival in the face of increasingly dominant technologies, pointing to positions
that are not only defensible in the face of the substitute, but may even increase in value
relative to intermediate positions.
The recognition that substitutes are not necessarily mutually exclusive, depending on prior
adoption history and within-buyer preferences, is critical for strategists competing in technologically dynamic industries, and highlights many avenues for future research to improve
our understanding of the dynamics of substitute competition.

5.1. Limitations and Future Directions
While this dissertation has covered a range of parameters that affect competition between
and co-adoption of partial substitutes, it has also abstracted away from many important
dimensions. While this limits the completeness of the current picture of this type of competition, it also points to many interesting projects to come.
A central question in strategy is why some firms perform better than others. This model
and empirical test focuses entirely on the technology level, while abstracting away from
firm-level competition. This is important for several reason. For example, a firm may want
to design their portfolio of offerings to maximize the chance of co-adoption within their own
offerings. This can be seen in Apple’s one-time strategy of limiting the maximize size of
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an iPhone and the minimum size of an iPad, in the hopes that many of their customers
would buy both. There are also important supply-side considerations that play a role in
any kind of technology competition. Even if buyer preferences can be perfectly measured
and targeted, the capabilities and resources of a firm might limit what they can profitably
offer, in terms of both offering position and range.
In addition to abstracting away from the firm, this dissertation uses value-based modeling,
which takes into account willingness to pay and cost, but not price. This omission takes
focus away from several key opportunities. The first relates to the previous limitation.
Because this research relates to partial substitutes, the value of adopting multiple offerings
is less than the sum of the value of adopting each. The approach to pricing optimized for
one may need to differ when optimizing for the other. In some cases, it may make sense
to bundle offerings, with a bundle price, but this may only be possible if the same seller is
offering both. Another research opportunity related to pricing could take into account that
there is heterogeneity between buyers (the focus of much of the previous work in this area),
while this dissertation focuses on the heterogeneity within buyers. In the absence of perfect
price discrimination, creating the most value does not always mean the buyer will purchase
the offering, if profits are maximized by setting the price above willingness-to-pay for some
buyers.
A third omission of this dissertation, and potential avenue for future research, is the sociocognitive element of adoption behavior. Buyers may not be able to perfectly understand
their own preferences, instead using heuristics to shape their choice. Beyond this, not
every offering in the marketplace can be considered for every purchase, because of bounded
rationality. This means that a decision set must be created, and then an offering selected
from that set. How these processes occur have been considered in other domains, but may
present uniquely interesting wrinkles in the context of partial substitutes.
Finally, this study takes the adoption of a particular technology as given, without considering the elements that shape smartphone adoption. The smartphone incorporates many
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functions beyond a camera, and it is the combination of these that determine not only
whether to buy a smartphone, but which device to buy. For example, if a user plans to
use the smartphone in place of their compact camera, they may spend more on a phone
with a better camera. This would not invalidate the model, but would shift the focus of
valuation from conditional value (of a camera conditional on smartphone adoption) to joint
value (where the buyer considers the value of buying both in choosing which smartphone
to buy). It is also possible that the phone is chosen for many other reasons, such as having
the fastest data speeds and largest screen for watching movies, but the phone with those
also happens to have a better camera, making the decision to buy a camera, or not, more
of the conditional value question. The extent to which buyers approach these decisions
sequentially, simultaneously, or even with the expectation of future improvements all are
important for firms to understand how best to position themselves.
Together, these limitations point the way to an expansive stream of future research, which
will paint a more complete picture of how firms can compete with and against partial
substitutes.
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APPENDIX
A.1. “Choose single best” positioning

Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20160605081526/http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/tech-tips-and-tricks/
laptop-vs-desktop-which-is-right-for-you.html
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